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GOOD FAITH IN THE TERMINATION AND FORMATION OF
FEDERAL CONTRACTS
FREDERICK W. CLAYBROOK, JR.*
It remains a touchstone in federal contracting law that when the
government enters the marketplace, it "contracts as does a private per-
son, under the broad dictates of the common law."' As the Supreme
Court stated over sixty years ago, "When the United States enters into
contract relations, its rights and duties therein are governed generally
by the law applicable to contracts between private individuals."' More
recently, in United States v. Winstar Corp.,3 the Supreme Court con-
strued federal contracts by "applying ordinary principles of contract
construction and breach that would be applicable to any contract ac-
tion between private parties."'
The law of good faith, an aspect of the common law of contracts,
is receiving heightened attention to befit its increasing importance.'
Professors Steven Burton and Eric Andersen have recently published a
book on this subject entitled Contractual Good Faith: Formation, Peforn-
© Copyright 1997 by Frederick W. Claybrook, Jr.
* Parmer, Crowell & Moring, Washington, D.C. A.B., Wheaton College (Ill.); J.D.,
Duke University.
1. Torncello v. United States, 681 F.2d 756, 762 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (en banc); see also
United States v. Bostwick, 94 U.S. 53, 66 (1876) ("The United States, when they contract
with their citizens, are controlled by the same laws that govern the citizen in that behalf.");
Cooke v. United States, 91 U.S. 389, 398 (1875) (stating that when the federal government
"enters the domain of commerce, it submits itself to the same laws that govern individuals
there").
2. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934); see aLso Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States, 318 U.S. 363, 369 (1943) ("The United States as drawee of commercial pa-
per stands in no different light than any other drawee."); United States v. Winstar Corp.,
116 S. CL 2432, 2464-65 (1996) (plurality opinion) (referring to the above-quoted Lynch
passage as a "general principle").
3. 116 S. Ct. 2432 (1996).
4. Id. at 2453 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 2473 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("'The
United States are as much bound by their contracts as are individuals.'" (quoting Sinking
Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 719 (1879))).
5. See Eric G. Andersen, Good Faith in the Enforcement of Contracts, 73 IowA L. REv. 299,
300 (1988) (indicating that the contractual duty of good faith, which had previously been
neglected in legal literature, is now the subject of extensive scholarly examination); see also
Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94
HARv. L. REv. 369, 369 (1980) ("A majority of American jurisdictions, the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts, and the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) now recognize the duty to
perform a contract in good faith as a general principle of contract law.") (footnotes omit-
ted); Steven J. Burton, More on Good Faith Performance of a Contract: A Reply to Professor Sum-
mers, 69 IowA L. REv. 497, 497-500 (1984) (discussing differing views on the role that the
law of good faith plays in the enforcement of contracts).
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ance, Breach, Enforcement.6 In their book, Professors Burton and Ander-
sen collect, summarize, and synthesize the current state of the law in
the area of contractual good faith and make suggestions for its proper
application and further development.7 They do not address, however,
the concept of contractual good faith as it has developed in govern-
ment contracts law.8 In one sense, that is surprising. Although Bur-
ton and Andersen trace the origins of the recognition of good faith
duties in common law cases to around 1885,1 the first recognition of
good faith duties in government contracts law arguably appeared even
earlier. In the 1874 case of Corliss Steam-Engine Co. v. United States,10
the newly constituted United States Court of Claims pronounced that
the federal government must deal with its contractors "in the strictest
fairness and justice."' Indeed, government contracts tribunals have
recognized that "because of its size, power, and potential ability to
manipulate the market place, the Government may have obligations
of fairness beyond those of the ordinary citizen."12
In another sense, it is not surprising that Burton and Andersen
ignore government contracts law. Despite the admonitions of the
Supreme Court that the government generally stands in the shoes of a
private party when it enters the marketplace,1 3 Congress has estab-
lished special tribunals to adjudicate federal contracts law matters-
the Court of Federal Claims 4 and the various boards of contract ap-
peals.15 Because Congress has legislated and agencies have regulated
6. STEVEN J. BURTON & ERIC G. ANDERSEN, CONTRACTUAL GOOD FAITH: FORMATION,
PERFORMANCE, BREACH, ENFORCEMENT (1995). Professors Burton and Andersen have writ-
ten extensively in the field of contractual good faith, and their work has, deservedly, been
critically acclaimed.
7. See id.
8. Burton and Andersen make only one foomote reference to "good faith in federal
government contracts," citing two recent Court of Federal Claims cases without significant
import. Id. at 75 n.1.
9. Id. at 23-24; see aLso Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Brydon, 3 A. 306, 309-10 (Md. 1886)
(declaring that daily shipments of coal delivered pursuant to a three-year requirements
contract could only be rejected in good faith); Singerly v. Thayer, 2 A. 230, 233 (Pa. 1885)
("To justify a refusal to accept [delivery] on the ground that it is not satisfactory, the objec-
tion should be made in good faith.").
10. 10 Ct. Cl. 494 (1874), aft'd, 91 U.S. 321 (1875).
11. Id. at 502.
12. R&R Enters., 89-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 21,708 at 109,148 (1989).
13. See supra note 1 (citing cases standing for the proposition that contract principles
apply equally to both government and private citizens).
14. See Contract Disputes Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-563, 92 Stat. 2383 (codified at 41
U.S.C. §§ 601-613 (1994)) (authorizing a party to a government contract to bring a claim
against the government directly to the United States Court of Federal Claims).
15. See 41 U.S.C. § 607(a), (d) (authorizing agencies to establish their own agency
board of contract appeals and granting these boards concurrent jurisdiction with the
Court of Federal Claims to decide appeals regarding contracts made by its agency). Prior
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extensively in the area of federal contracts,16 the tribunals deciding
government contracts cases and those deciding common law contracts
cases most frequently work without cross-pollination. 7
The government contracts tribunals have not always kept abreast
of the common law; that failure has been most marked in the area of
contractual good faith. While government contracts tribunals have
long recognized good faith duties of the government,'" federal con-
tracts law has not kept pace with the private law of contractual good
faith in the specific areas of contract termination and contract forma-
tion. The law regarding appropriate limits on the government's exer-
cise of its right to terminate a contract "for convenience" is especially
confused.
to 1982, the Court of Claims was composed of an appellate and a trial division. The Fed-
eral Courts Improvement Act of 1982 eliminated the Court of Claims (in name) and gave
its appellate functions to the newly constituted Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
and its trial functions to the newly constituted Claims Court. See Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96
Stat. 25 (1982) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. and other titles).
Many agencies have boards of contract appeals. Most Department of Defense contracts are
handled by the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA), the largest of the
boards. Other active boards include the General Services Administration Board of Con-
tract Appeals (GSBCA), the Department of Transportation Board of Contract Appeals
(DOT BCA), the Agriculture Board of Contract Appeals (AGBCA), the National Aeronau-
tics and Space Administration Board of Contract Appeals (NASA BCA), the Interior Board
of Contract Appeals (IBCA), and the Army Corps of Engineers Board of Contract Appeals
(ENG BCA). Decisions from the boards are published in the Commerce Clearing House
volumes of Board of Contract Appeals Decisions (BCA).
16. See, e.g., Federal Acquisition Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, §§ 4001-
4402, 110 Stat. 186, 642-679 (to be codified at scattered sections of 10, 18, 22, 31, 41, and
other tides of U.S.C.); Contract Disputes Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-563, 92 Stat. 2383
(codified at 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-613 (1994)); Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), 48 C.F.R.
pts. 1-52 (1996).
17. Common law courts only infrequently must resort to federal contracts law. The
most common instance in which they do is when a subcontract under a government prime
contract contains standard federal contract clauses "flowed down" by the prime or higher-
tier subcontractors. In such situations, the applicable common law requires the standard
federal clause to be construed consistently with trade practice, which is generally supplied
by federal precedent of the Federal Circuit, Court of Federal Claims, successor courts, and
the boards of contract appeals. See Linan-Faye Constr. Co. v. Housing Auth., 49 F.3d 915,
919-22 (3d Cir. 1995); Brinderson Corp. v. Hampton Roads Sanitation Dist., 825 F.2d 41,
44 (4th Cir. 1987); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Garrett Corp., 437 F. Supp. 1301, 1329 (D.
Md. 1977), affd per curiam, 601 F.2d 155 (4th Cir. 1979); see also New SD, Inc. v. Rockwell
Int'l Corp., 79 F.3d 953, 955 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that federal common law applies to
federal clauses flowed down in private contracts). As will be discussed further, the federal
district courts also have jurisdiction to consider the propriety of agency awards of con-
tracts. See infra notes 219 & 224 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., Malone v. United States, 849 F.2d 1441, 1445 (Fed. Cir.) (noting that a
breach of good faith and fair dealing duties can be a material breach of contract), modified,
857 F.2d 787 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Corliss Steam-Engine Co. v. United States, 10 Ct. Cl. 494,
502 (1874) (stating that the government must deal with individuals with whom they con-
tract in "the strictest fairness and justice"), affd, 91 U.S. 321 (1875).
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This Article analyzes the current state of federal contracts law
with respect to contract termination and contract formation, and
compares it to the common law, using Burton and Andersen's work as
a springboard. This Article argues that government contracts law has
fallen out of step with the common law governing contracts between
private parties with respect to good faith duties. Finally, this Article
suggests that federal contracts law should return to the principal
touchstone of common law interpretation.
Applying the common law of good faith duties to federal con-
tracts law supports the following conclusions: First, the courts should
recognize that the government must exercise its discretion to termi-
nate for convenience in good faith, and, furthermore, the govern-
ment can breach those duties even when it does not terminate in
subjective bad faith. Second, in contract formation cases, the courts
should recognize that a breach of good faith duties, as defined by law
or regulation, often allows the award of lost profits, as the contours of
the aborted final contract can generally be ascertained with reason-
able certainty to an even greater extent than in private contracts.
I. GOOD FAITH As DEFINED IN THE COMMON LAW
Almost all common lawjurisdictions in the United States now rec-
ognize an implied duty and covenant of good faith binding the parties
to a contract. 19 Burton and Andersen have tracked the recent bur-
geoning of case law in this area. They report that in all the years
before 1980, "there were perhaps 350 reported cases interpreting the
obligation to perform a contract in good faith. In the dozen years
following 1980, there were another 600 or more."2 °
The common law courts, particularly since 1980, have largely
reached a consensus on the appropriate application of good faith du-
ties.21 The first key component of this consensus is that good faith
theory serves, rather than rewrites, the intent of the parties as ex-
pressed in their contract document." The second, corollary key con-
cept is that good faith duties require the party that is to exercise
discretion to do so consistently with the language and purposes of the
contract." The critical point of inquiry for this second key concept is
19. BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 6, at 21-22.
20. I1. at 22.
21. Id. at 38.
22. 1& at 62-63.
23. Id. at 44-60, 85-90; see also id at 53 n.35 (citing Boone v. Kerr-McGee Oil Indus., 217
F.2d 63, 65 (10th Cir. 1954) ("[S]uch discretion must.., be exercised in good faith. That
simply means that what is done must be done honestly to effectuate the object and purpose
the parties had in mind in providing for the exercise of power.")).
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the expectations of the parties at the time they formed the contract.
Specifically, a party acts in "bad faith"-which the common law courts
in this context use synonymously with not acting in contractual good
faith 24-when it uses "contractual discretion to recapture opportuni-
ties forgone when contracting,"2 5 or performs "for reasons outside the
justified expectations of the parties arising from their agreement."26
Burton and Andersen summarize as follows:
The goal should be an accommodation of the contrac-
tual interests of the parties. The public has an interest in the
security of contractual transactions: in contract performance
and enforcement, we should protect the parties' justified ex-
pectations arising from agreements that have passed the tests
of enforceability....
A discretion-exercising party has an interest in maintain-
ing the full range of discretionary action as agreed, and often
bargained for, calling upon judges and juries to refrain from
second-guessing amounting to ad hoc regulation. By con-
trast, the other party has an interest, also often bargained
for, in securing some measure of protection from abuses of
discretion by his contract partner. Focusing on a discretion-
exercising party's reasons for action, finding liability only
when a party acts for a reason given up when entering the
contract freely, tends to hold a discretion-exercising party to
its voluntary undertakings without engaging in second-guess-
ing or hidden regulation. It protects one party's justified ex-
pectations that the other will act for expectable reasons in
the relevant business context. This approach preserves a rea-
sonable scope for discretion, rooting the limits on discretion
in the parties' agreement.27
Although government contracts tribunals have recognized that
implied obligations of good faith, cooperation, and fair dealing exist
between parties to a government contract,28 and in some areas have
imposed on the government good faith duties consistent with the
24. Id. at 52-57; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTs § 205 & cmts. (1981).
25. BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 6, at 45.
26. Id. at 57.
27. Id. at 58.
28. See, e.g., Malone v. United States, 849 F.2d 1441, 1445 (Fed. Cir.) (finding that the
government breached contract by failing to comply with standards of good faith between
contracting parties), modified, 857 F.2d 787 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Cedar Lumber, Inc. v. United
States, 5 Cl. Ct. 539, 549 (1984) (stating that there is an implied obligation for parties to a
contract to cooperate and not to hinder the performance of the other party); Robert L.
Merwin & Co., 83-2 B.CA (CCH) 16,745 at 83,273 (1983) (recognizing that an implied
contract of good faith and fair dealing exists between parties to a government contract).
1997]
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common law governing contracts between private parties, ' 9 none of
the government contracts cases articulates an overarching rationale
for good faith duties and the application of those duties in contract
settings."0 Nowhere is this more apparent than in the field of govern-
ment termination of contracts. After an initial movement in the
proper direction by the Court of Claims," l the Federal Circuit has po-
tentially imposed a full stop on the development of good faith duties
consistent with the common law regarding termination of federal
contracts.
3 2
II. GOOD FAITH IN THE TERMINATION OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
Burton and Andersen note that only "[a] few very weak common
law authorities suggest that a party whose exercise of discretion is mo-
tivated by malice or other wrongful motives is in breach of contract
for failing to perform in good faith." 3 These "few very weak" cases do
not focus on the dispositive inquiry. Although an improper, subjec-
tive motive may provide circumstantial evidence of bad faith because
it suggests the party is seeking some advantage beyond that intended
by the contract,3 4 a majority of common law courts now hold to an
objective standard of whether the party with discretion exercises it
within the reasonable expectations of the parties stemming from the
29. See, e.g., Malone, 849 F.2d at 1445-46 (finding that the government breached its duty
to cooperate by failing to disapprove a contractual interpretation prior to the contractor's
acting in reliance on the interpretation); Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. United States, 312
F.2d 774, 778 (CL Cl. 1963) (finding that the government breached good faith duties when
it did not disclose to a contractor its superior knowledge about the specified manufactur-
ing process). See generally Daniel E. Toomey et al., Good Faith and Fair Dealing: The Well-Nigh
Irrefragable Need for a New Standard in Public Contract Law, 20 PUB. CoNT. LJ. 87, 109-14
(1990) (discussing certain implied duties that are incorporated in the principle of good
faith and fair dealing between parties to a contract).
30. Government contracts cases discussing good faith duties do not discuss common
law precedents, although they do on occasion cite the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,
which provides in part, "Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and
fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement," RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 205 (1981), and the U.C.C., which provides, "Every contract or duty within this
Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement." U.C.C. § 1-
203 (1996). See, e.g., Malone, 849 F.2d at 1445 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 205); 6800 Corp., 83-2 B.CA (CCH) 16,581 at 82,449 (1983) (same); John C.
Kohler Co. v. United States, 204 Ct. Cl. 777, 789 n.6 (1974) ("The Uniform Commercial
Code is applicable to the field of public contracts."). Burton and Andersen note that the
law of good faith has advanced, and in many respects crystallized, since the U.C.C. formula-
tion in 1951 and the Restatement summation in 1973. BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 6, at
3440.
31. See infra notes 63-87 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
33. BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 6, at 75.
34. See supra notes 24-26 (defining common law bad faith).
[VOL. 56:555
GOOD FAITH IN FEDERAL CONTRACTS
promises made at contract formation. 5 Thus, a party cannot be ex-
cused from an improper exercise of discretion because it had a "kind
heart and an empty head." 6 Burton and Andersen remark:
On the question whether wrongful motives establish bad
faith, our answer is clear and amply supported by the cases:
wrongful reasons may establish bad faith, but an absence of
wrongful reasons does not establish good faith. Wrongful
reasons establish bad faith not because they are wrongful,
but instead because they are outside the reasonable expecta-
tions of the parties. An absence of such reasons, however,
does not suffice to establish good faith because bad faith may
also consist of action for reasons that are disallowed by the
contract even though not wrongful.
These principles expressly apply to the termination of contracts.3 " As
Burton and Andersen state, "When there is a contract [a party] with
discretion to terminate should be required to terminate only in good
faith."3 9
This lesson has been put into practice only spasmodically in gov-
ernment contracts law. The specialized government contracts tribu-
nals have instead improperly focused exclusively on a subjective bad
faith standard when assessing an agency's termination of a contract.
In doing so, they have deviated from the proper application of good
faith duties as elucidated by the common law.'
A. Government Termination Law Prior to Torncello
A "termination-for-convenience" clause is a common feature in
government contracts. 41 Although not essential to every contract in
which the government is a party,42 a termination-for-convenience
35. BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 6, at 89-90.
36. Id. at 83 (internal quotations omitted).
37. I. at 77-78, 289-90.
38. Id. at 91-95 (employment contracts), 142-46 (franchise contracts).
39. Id. at 93, 130-34; see also Sons of Thunder, Inc. v. Borden, Inc., No. A-37, 1997 WL
104592, at *14-16 (N.J. Mar. 11, 1997) (upholding jury verdict that defendant breached
duty of good faith notwithstanding express right to terminate the contract).
40. See infra notes 96-101 and accompanying text (discussing the common law prece-
dent concerning good faith duties in terminations).
41. See Stephen N. Young, Note, Limiting the Government's Ability to Terminate for Its Con-
venwnce Following Torncello, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 892, 892 (1984).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Winstar Corp., 116 S. Ct. 2432 (1996) (contracts represent-
ing business arrangements without termination-for-convenience clause); Wells Fargo Bank,
NA v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 233 (1995) (same), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 88 F.3d
1012 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. CL 1245 (1997);Johnson v. United States, 15 Cl.




clause is required in most government contracts under the applicable
provisions of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)." Even when
not expressly incorporated into a government contract, a termination-
for-convenience clause will be incorporated by law if it was required to
have been included by regulation." Moreover, if the government ter-
minates for an improper purpose-for default when the contractor
was not truly in default, for example-the termination generally can
be "constructively" converted into a termination for convenience if
such a clause is present in the contract.45
The government is given broad discretion under a termination-
for-convenience clause to terminate a contract.4 6 The termination-
for-convenience clause, which must be included in most fixed-price
contracts over $100,000,47 provides, like other termination clauses,
"The Government may terminate performance of work under this
contract in whole or, from time to time, in part if the Contracting
Officer determines that a termination is in the Government's inter-
43. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. § 49.501-05 (1996). The FAR requires termination-for-conven-
ience clauses in various types of fixed-price and cost-reimbursement contracts. See id.
§ 49.501. The FAR also permits special purpose clauses to be negotiated and allows devia-
tions from FAR requirements if approved at the specified level. See id. §§ 1.402 (allowing
special purpose termination clauses), 49.501 (same).
44. This principle has taken the name of the "Christian doctrine" after the lead case in
the area. See G.L. Christian & Assocs. v. United States, 320 F.2d 345, 351 (Ct. Cl. 1963)
(holding that "an authorized regulation can impose ... peremptory requirements on fed-
eral officials and those who seek to enter into transactions with the Government"). The
Christian doctrine does not extend to situations in which a termination-for-convenience
clause is not required by law to have been included in the contract. SeeJohnson, 15 Cl. Ct.
at 171-72.
45. Constructive termination-for-convenience theory finds its leading exposition in the
decision of John Reiner & Co. v. United States, 325 F.2d 438 (Ct. Cl. 1963). The John Reiner
court found support for its position, in turn, from the Supreme Court's decision in Co/lege
Point Boat Corp. v. United States, 267 U.S. 12 (1925). John Reiner, 325 F.2d at 443. In Co/lege
Point, the Court held that the damages for the government's stopping work on a contract
and being in anticipatory breach could be limited by a statute then in force that allowed
the government to cancel World War I contracts after the war ended, even though the
government agency did not purport to act under that statute. College Point, 267 U.S. at 15-
16. The standard federal default clauses now expressly provide that if a defaulted contrac-
tor was not in default when terminated or the default condition was excusable, "the rights
and obligations of the parties shall be the same as if the termination had been issued for
the convenience of the Government." See, e.g., FAR, 48 C.F.R. § 52.249-8(g) (1996) (De-
fault (Fixed-Price Supply and Service)).
46. SeeYoung, supra note 41, at 897 (indicating that a contracting officer, in exercising
his discretion to terminate a contract under a termination-for-convenience clause, may
consider a "'host of variable and unspecified situations'" (quoting John Reiner & Co., 325
F.2d at 442)). The Supreme Court last term held, however, that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments restrict the government's ability to terminate a contractor because he ex-
presses or does not express specific political views. See O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of
Northlake, 116 S. Ct 2353, 2356-61 (1996).
47. See 48 C.F.R. § 49.502(b).
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est."" When the termination-for-convenience clause is properly in-
voked, either expressly or constructively, it limits the recoverable
damages of the contractor to the work performed, plus incidental ex-
penses due to the termination,4 9 thereby foreclosing breach dam-
ages. 50 Lost profits are allowed for work performed, but not for work
terminated.51
Limits have always been placed on the government's discretion to
use a termination-for-convenience clause.5" For example, it has long
been held that an agency may not properly terminate for conven-
ience, either expressly or constructively, if it acted in "bad faith" or
committed a "clear abuse of discretion."55  Bad faith has been con-
strued in federal contracts termination law, however, to mean subjec-
tive bad faith, rather than simply the failure to perform in good faith,
objectively tested against the duties arising from the contract itself, as
enjoined by the prevailing common law precedents. 54 Moreover, gov-
ernment contracts tribunals impose the rule that to prove subjective
bad faith on the part of the government agency terminating the con-
tract, the terminated contractor must put forward "well-nigh irrefraga-
ble proof."5
5
The high-water mark of the government's perceived discretion to
exercise the termination-for-convenience clause was the 1974 Court of
48. 48 C.F.R. § 52.249-2; see also 48 C.F.R. § 52.249-1 ("The Contracting Officer, by writ-
ten notice, may terminate this contract, in whole or in part, when it is in the Government's
interest."); 48 C.F.R. § 52.249-6(a) ("The Government may terminate performance of work
under this contract in whole or, from time to time, in part, if... [t] he Contracting Officer
determines that a termination is in the Government's interest .... ").
49. The applicable termination-for-convenience clause and referenced FAR provisions
spell out in some detail the recovery allowed to the contractor in a termination for conven-
ience. See, e.g., 48 C.F.R. § 52.249-2; see aLso 48 C.F.R. § 31.205-42 (specifying recoverable
costs due to a termination).
50. See John Reinetr, 325 F.2d at 444 (indicating that a party to a contract may not recover
anticipated profit when the government exercises a termination-for-convenience clause).
51. See 48 C.F.R. § 52.249-2(0 (Termination for Convenience of the Government
(Fixed-Price)).
52. Torncello v. United States, 681 F.2d 756, 764-66 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (en banc) (discuss-
ing history of termination for convenience clauses).
53. See, e.g., National Factors, Inc. v. United States, 492 F.2d 1383, 1385 (CL Cl. 1974)
(per curiam) ("The termination of a contract for the convenience of the government is
valid only in the absence of bad faith or a clear abuse of discretion." (citing Commercial
Cable Co. v. United States, 170 Ct. Cl. 813, 821 (1965)));John Reiner, 325 F.2d at 442 ("[1]n
the absence of bad faith or clear abuse of discretion the contracting officer's election to
terminate is conclusive.").
54. See infra notes 102-120 and accompanying text.
55. See Knotts v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 630, 631 (CL Cl. 1954); see also Kalvar Corp.
v. United States, 543 F.2d 1298, 1301-02 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (noting that "irrefragable proof" has
been equated with evidence of some specific intent to injure the plaintiff), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 830 (1977).
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Claims decision in Colonial Metals Co. v. United States.56 In Colonial Met-
als, the government contracted for a supply of copper from a contrac-
tor, but soon terminated the contract in order to get a better price
from another source.5 7 Notwithstanding the court's finding that the
government "knew or ought to have known" that a better price was
readily available,5" the court validated the government's exercise of
the termination clause solely to gain a better deal. 9 The court stated:
Termination to buy elsewhere at a cheaper price is es-
sentially such a termination as has repeatedly been ap-
proved. The added element that the contracting officer
knew of the better price elsewhere when he awarded the con-
tract to plaintiff-in the absence of some proof of malice or
conspiracy against the plaintiff-means only that the con-
tract was awarded improvidently and does not narrow the
right to terminate. The clause is not designed to perpetuate
error, but to permit its rectification.
Termination for convenience is as available for contracts
improvident in their origin as for contracts which super-
vening events show to be onerous or unprofitable for the
Government.60
The court in Colonial Metals effectively ruled that in the absence of bad
faith,6 ' there are no limits on the government's power to repudiate a
contract under a termination-for-convenience clause if the govern-
ment believes it is in its interest to do so.
62
56. 494 F.2d 1355 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (per curiam) (adopting the recommended decision of
the trial judge as the basis for its judgment in the case); see Linan-Faye Constr. Co. v. Hous-
ing Auth., 49 F.3d 915, 924 (3d Cir. 1995) (describing Colonial Metals as the high-water
mark of permissiveness in allowing government to terminate).
57. Colonial Metals, 494 F.2d at 1357.
58. Id. at 1360.
59. Id. at 1361.
60. Id. (citation omitted).
61. The court in Colonial Metals did not repudiate the "subjective bad faith or clear
abuse of discretion" exception articulated in prior opinions. See id. at 1359. The abuse of
discretion exception and its scope are not well defined, with few cases addressing how it
differs from bad faith, even after Colonial Metals. Some tribunals, however, have made a
distinction. See, e.g., Vibra-Tech Eng'rs, Inc. v. United States, 567 F. Supp. 484, 486-87 (D.
Colo. 1983) (applying abuse of discretion standard without finding bad faith); Viktoria
Transp. GmbH & Co., KG, 88-3 B.CA (CCH) 20,921 at 105,737 (1988) (defining abuse
of discretion standard separately). Others have accepted the equivalence of the concepts
arguendo. See, e.g., Kalvar Corp. v. United States, 543 F.2d 1298, 1301 n.1 (Ct. Cl. 1976)
("[M]any of our prior decisions seem implicitly to accept the equivalence of bad faith,
abuse of discretion, and gross error.").
62. See Karl M. Elcessor, III, Torncello and the Changed Circumstances Rule: "A Sheep in
Wol's Clothing,"ARMv LAw., Nov. 1991, at 18, 19.
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B. Torncello to the Present
Eight years later, the Court of Claims overruled Colonial Metals in
Torncello v. United States.63 In Torn/ello, the government had entered
into a requirements contract, but after executing the contract, began
to divert a particular portion of the business to a competitor that had
offered to perform this specific component of the contract at a lower
price.' At the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA),
the government had successfully defended on a theory that diversion
of some of the requirements to the other company was a constructive
partial termination for convenience by the government.65
Writing the plurality opinion, Judge Bennett undertook a histori-
cal analysis of the termination-for-convenience clause. 66 He explained
that "the convenience termination clause developed as a wartime con-
cept, and it was a way for the government to avoid the continuance of
contracts that the rapid changes of war, or the war's end, had made
useless or senseless. 67 Judge Bennett also noted that use of the clause
had continued into peacetime procurement, but "the basic idea re-
mained constant that convenience termination was an allocation of
the risk of changed conditions."' Therefore, he found that the risk
allocation justification for the termination-for-convenience clause,
under all precedent other than Colonial Metals, could only be used
"when the expectations of the parties had been subjected to a substan-
tial change. The contractor risked losing the full benefit of his per-
formance if something occurred, apart from the bargain and the
expectations of the parties, that made continuance of the contract
clearly inadvisable."69 After reviewing the relevant history, Judge Ben-
nett determined that "the termination for convenience clause was
only to be applied where there was some change from the parties'
63. 681 F.2d 756 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (en banc).
64. Id. at 758.
65. Id. at 758-59. A more appropriate rationale for rejecting the ASBCA's constructive
use of the termination-for-convenience clause than that adopted by the Court of Claims
would have been: (1) the covenant that the government would buy all of its requirements
from the contractor is not principally a quantity term (subject to total or partial termina-
tion); (2) but, instead, is principally a condition of the contract not subject to the termina-
tion clause; and (3) thus, the termination clause was not appropriately brought into play at
all, as the government concededly had requirements that it bought elsewhere. The Court
of Claims, however, did not consider this argument and decided the case as if the termina-
tion clause could have been appropriately invoked in these circumstances, even if there
were not a cessation of requirements.
66. Id. at 763-66 (plurality opinion).
67. Id. at 763 (citing II RALPH C. NASH &JOHN CIBINIC,JR., FEDERAL PROCUREMENT LAW
1104-07 (3d ed. 1980)).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 766.
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original bargain and was not to be applied as broadly as an untutored
reading of the words might suggest."70
Judge Bennett next noted that if the termination-for-convenience
clause were interpreted to give the government an unrestricted "out,"
the contract would fail for want of consideration. 71 The government
argued that the exercise of discretion to terminate the contract was
sufficiently limited because the contracting officer was required to de-
termine in good faith that termination would be in the best interest of
the government.72 The Torncello plurality rejected this argument be-
cause it read existing case law to require an "extremely difficult show-
ing" of "well-nigh irrefragable proof' that the government acted in
subjective bad faith 7 -1with specific intent to injure the contractor by
actions "motivated alone by malice,"74 by "designedly oppressive" con-
duct, ' or by conduct "actuated by animus" toward the contractor.76
To the government's parallel assertion that its power to terminate was
subject to a sufficient limitation, in that it could not properly invoke
the termination clause if it would be "a clear abuse of discretion" to
do so, 7 7 Judge Bennett responded that no limits on that discretion
were stated, and so, in essence, the argument was circular.78  He
concluded:
[T] he requirement of good faith is not sufficient because the
government's presumption of good faith dealing is rebutta-
ble only in the most extreme circumstances, when there is a
specific intent to harm the contractor. And the govern-
ment's obligation to avoid clear abuses of discretion is only
an illusion. Without any other limits, the concept of discre-
tion is meaningless. 79
In the plurality's view, the subjective bad faith and clear abuse of
discretion restrictions on the government's exercise of its termination
70. Id. Colonial Metals did not involve a change of conditions and, therefore, violated
this principle. See Colonial Metals Co. v. United States, 494 F.2d 1355 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (per
curiam). In Colonial Metas, the use of the termination-for-convenience clause was to re-
make the contract with another party "for a reason that was known or should have been
known to the government before the contract was awarded." Tornce/o, 681 F.2d at 766 (plu-
rality opinion).
71. Tornello, 681 F.2d at 768-72 (plurality opinion). In Judge Bennett's terminology,
he rejected a "free termination" right in the government. Id. at 771.
72. Id. at 770-71.
73. Id. (quoting Knotts v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 630, 631 (Ct. Cl. 1954)).
74. Id. (quoting Gadsden v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 126, 127 (Ct. Cl. 1948)).
75. Id. at 771 (quoting Struck Constr. Co. v. United States, 96 Ct. Cl. 186, 222 (1942)).
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rights could not provide brakes on the government's power to excul-
pate itself sufficient to constitute adequate consideration to support
the contract 0 As a result, the Torncello plurality held that the govern-
ment may not employ the termination-for-convenience clause "to dis-
honor, with impunity, its contractual obligations."81
Writing in a concurring opinion, Chief Judge Friedman viewed
the case narrowly. He stated that he understood the plurality's opin-
ion to mean that the termination-for-convenience clause is only inap-
plicable when the government, at the time of contracting, knows it
will not honor its requirements contract because it plans to place or-
ders with a competing contractor.8 2
Concurring in the result, Judge Davis also stressed the govern-
ment's preexisting knowledge that it planned to dishonor the require-
ments contract via the termination-for-convenience clause.83 He
expressly disagreed with the plurality's analysis of the abuse of discre-
tion and bad faith exceptions, however, finding them less narrow than
Judge Bennett portrayed them.84 Based on the facts of Tomcello,
Judge Davis found both of those standards to have been violated.'
Judge Nichols, who also wrote separately and concurred in the
result, continued to embrace the bad faith and clear abuse of discre-
tion standards, finding them sufficient to furnish consideration. 6
Based on the facts of Torncello, however, Judge Nichols found it to be
an abuse of discretion for the government to have acted the way it
did.8 7
The plurality and three concurring opinions in Torncelo left its
controlling rationale unclear. Only recently has the Federal Circuit
80. See id.
81. IM at 772.
82. See id. at 773 (Friedman, C.J., concurring).
83. See id. (Davis, J., concurring in the result).
84. See id.
85. See idU at 773-74. Judge Davis had "no difficulty" in finding the government's con-
duct to have been an abuse of discretion and in bad faith. Id. He went on to add, however,
that if the government became aware of a better price after executing the requirements
contract, that would potentially be a changed circumstance sufficient to allow the govern-
ment to terminate the original contract and to take advantage of the better price. Id. at
774; see infra notes 95-101 (discussing the inconsistency of this suggestion with common law
precedent).
86. Tornce/. 681 F.2d at 774 (Nichols, J., concurring in the result).
87. Id. Judge Nichols pointed out that the pest control services, which had been the
subject of the requirements contract, were only one aspect of the overall contract, with
other parts of performance also considered in the award of the contract. See id. He found
it arbitrary and capricious for the government, after awarding the contract based on evalu-
ation of each bid in its entirety, to grant subsequently a particular portion of the contract
to an unsuccessful bidder that had offered to perform that aspect of the solicitation at a
lower price. See id.
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(the successor court to the Court of Claims) apparently settled on how
it will read Torncello. The Federal Circuit initially repeated that
"changed expectations" are a prerequisite to a proper termination for
convenience.8s In Caldwell & Santmyer, Inc. v. Glickman,s9 however,
the Federal Circuit, in dicta, read Torncello very restrictively. In a curi-
ous mix of references to Judge Bennett's plurality opinion and the
three concurring opinions, the Federal Circuit reiterated the princi-
ple that the government is presumed to act in good faith unless a
contractor can show "through 'well-nigh irrefragable proof that the
government had a specific intent to injure it."1 9 Despite Judge Ben-
nett's rejection of the bad faith and abuse of discretion exceptions, 9'
the Federal Circuit went on to identify Torncello as a subjective bad
faith case that stood only for the "'unremarkable proposition that
when the government contracts with a party knowing full well that it
will not honor the contract, it cannot avoid a breach claim by ad-
verting to the convenience termination clause."' 91 Building on the
dicta in Caldwell, the Federal Circuit in Kiygoski Construction Co. v.
88. See Salsbury Indus. v. United States, 905 F.2d 1518, 1521-22 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (find-
ing that a court injunction directing the postal service to terminate a contract was an "un-
anticipated change in circumstances, not merely justifying but compelling termination of
the contract"); Maxima Corp. v. United States, 847 F.2d 1549, 1553, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(noting that both parties acknowledged that there must be some changed circumstances
prior to exercising a termination-for-convenience clause).
89. 55 F.3d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
90. Id. at 1581.
91. See supra notes 66-81 and accompanying text.
92. Caldwe// 55 F.3d at 1582 (quoting Salsbuty Indus., 905 F.2d at 1521). The ASBCA
has consistently refused to follow the plurality opinion in Tornce//o. In assessing the legiti-
macy of express or constructive terminations for convenience, the ASBCA has continued to
apply what it terms the subjective "bad faith/abuse of discretion" standard. The ASBCA
purports to rely on the Tomce /o concurring opinions, but it does not specify which one or
ones in particular. See Special Waste, Inc., 90-2 B.CA (CCH) 1 22,935 at 115,129 (1990)
("A Government good faith determination after contract award that it did not need the
contract item ... was all that was required to support a termination for convenience.");
Viktoria Transp. GmbH & Co., KG, 88-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 20,921 at 105,737 (1988) ("The
authorities are clear that breach damages have been awarded in breach of requirements
contract situations only where there is bad faith or abuse of discretion on the part of the
Government."); Vec-Tor, Inc., 85-1 B.CA. (CCH) 1 17,755 at 88,677 (1984) ("We agree
with the concurring opinions [in Torncello and will follow the bad faith/abuse of discre-
tion rule regarding convenience-termination until the 'change of circumstances' rule is
adopted by a clear majority of the Court.").
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United StateP3 declared the Tomcello plurality's analysis to be mori-
bund, except as limited to its facts as explained in Caldwel.94
C. Good Faith Duties in Government Terminations
The Federal Circuit's apparent retrenchment in Caldwell and
Kiygoski, suggesting that a contractor must prove subjective bad faith to
establish that the government abused its discretion to terminate for
convenience, runs directly counter to the recent common law consen-
sus regarding terminations.9" Under the common law, proving bad
faith-in the sense of a breach of good faith duties-does not require
showing subjective bad faith.96 Although the government understand-
ably gives itself broad discretion to exercise its right to terminate, that
discretion, like other exercises of discretion, should only be exercised
in good faith. The failure of the courts and boards adjudicating gov-
ernment contracts disputes to recognize that the government has a
duty to exercise its termination discretion in good faith has caused
confusion in the case law.9 7 This confusion could be alleviated by re-
quiring that the government, like a private citizen, exercise its termi-
nation discretion in good faith.
Although Burton and Andersen find it "not problematic" that if a
valid contract exists, a party's discretion to terminate is constrained by
93. 94 F.3d 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 65 U.S.L.W. 3571 (U.S. May 12, 1997)
(No. 96-1236). Correctly forecasting the Federal Circuit's further elucidation in Kygoski, a
commentator on Caldwel stated, "Thus, the holding of Torncello, which placed reasonable
limits on the government's broad right to terminate a government contract for conven-
ience, has effectively been abandoned." Michael W. Clancy, 1995 Year in Review: The Fed-
eral Circuit's Government Contracts Decisions, 25 PUB. CONT. L.J. 537, 580 (1996).
94. Krygoski 94 F.3d at 1542. The Kiygoski court reaffirmed that a termination for con-
venience would be a breach if it were a clear abuse of discretion or taken in subjective bad
faith. Id. at 1543. The Kiygoski court sought to buttress its conclusion that the Tornelo
plurality opinion was not good law by referring to the Competition in Contracting Act
(CICA). Id. at 1542-43. The only relevance of CICA, however, is to define the duties of the
procuring agencies and, derivatively, the reasonable expectations of the parties. See Com-
petition in Contracting Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 1175 (codified in scattered
sections of 5, 10, 31, 40, and 41 U.S.C.) (delineating, inter alia, government procurement
procedures, competition requirements, and award guidelines). The actual facts of Kiygoski,
as explained by the Federal Circuit, would arguably meet the Torn/ello plurality's test of
sufficiently changed circumstances to support a termination for convenience, but the
panel sidestepped that obvious conclusion in favor of its limiting construction of Tornce/o.
Krygoski, 94 F.3d at 1543 ("Although arguably the Government's circumstances had suffi-
ciently changed to meet even the Tornce!o plurality standard, this court declines to reach
this issue because Torne/o applies only when the Government enters a contract with no
intention of fulfilling its promises.").
95. See infra notes 102-120 and accompanying text.
96. BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 6, at 89.
97. See supra notes 63-87 and accompanying text.
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good faith duties,9" that very proposition has escaped open and uni-
form recognition in the government contracts termination-for-con-
venience cases.99 While government contracts tribunals have no
problem applying common law good faith principles in other contract
performance settings, 100 they have failed to apply regularly the same
good faith rules in termination settings.'0 1
1. Good Faith in Common Law Termination Cases.-Common law
jurisprudence has consistently implied a good faith duty in contract
termination cases.102 Employment situations provide a clear window
to these common law cases. Burton and Andersen distinguish be-
tween "contracts promising employment for a definite duration, even
if equal only to a required period following notice of termination, and
those involving employment terminable at the employer's will."10' In
the former case, "[t ] he applicability of a good faith performance cove-
nant is not problematic,"" ° and "an employer with discretion to ter-
minate should be required to terminate only in good faith.""°5
Even in employment-at-will situations, however, an employee may
not be terminated for reasons contrary to the justified expectations of
the parties."0 6 KMart Corp. v. Ponsock'07 provides a good example. In
that case, a company used a pretext to fire an older, tenured em-
98. BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 6, at 91-93; see also Danella Southwest, Inc. v.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 775 F. Supp. 1227, 1236 (E.D. Mo. 1991) ("The implied duty of
good faith and fair dealing extends to the cancellation of a contract."). Burton and Ander-
sen point out that some courts find that, because an at-will employee may be discharged
for no reason or even a morally wrong reason, an at-will employee does not have a contrac-
tual relationship with her employer. BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 6, at 92.
99. See supra notes 63-87 and accompanying text.
100. For example, the Federal Circuit recently imposed good faith duties during con-
tract negotiation, noting that those duties provide the necessary mutuality of obligation to
enforce an open-price term contract. See Aviation Contractor Employees, Inc. v. United
States, 945 F.2d 1568, 1572-73 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see also Malone v. United States, 849 F.2d
1441, 1445-46 (Fed. Cir.) (holding that the government breached its good faith duty when
an Air Force contracting officer's evasive conduct interfered with the contractor's perform-
ance), modified, 857 F.2d 787 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Isadore & Miriam Klein, 84-2 B.CA (CCH)
17,273 at 86,004 (1984) (finding that the government agency breached its good faith
duty when it used a mistaken statutory limit during price negotiations).
101. See supra notes 56-94 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
103. BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 6, at 91.
104. Id. at 91-92.
105. I. at 93.
106. Id. at 94-95. Burton and Andersen are careful to note that the good faith doctrine
does not convert a terminable-at-will contract into a contract that can only be terminated
for "good cause." Id. at 93-94. Rather, the parties reserve broad discretion in such a situa-
tion, but not such discretion that the justified expectations of the parties can be violated.
Id.
107. 732 P.2d 1364 (Nev. 1987).
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ployee so that it would not have to pay him retirement benefits.10
The court found that the company's action "reek[ed] of oppression
and malice" and that the company had violated its duty to act in good
faith when terminating an employee."t° In Burnaman v. Bay City In-
dependent School District," the court found the defendant school dis-
trict to have acted in bad faith when it discharged a teacher on the
basis of a written evaluation containing information that the defend-
ants knew or should have known was false and inaccurate, and when
school district employees then tried to cover up their actions in viola-
tion of their own regulations.'11 Recent cases considering similar is-
sues have held that an employer violates good faith duties when it
discharges an at-will employee to avoid paying her benefits earned,
thus making the company more profitable.
1 12
Common law courts have applied the same good faith principles
in nonemployment situations. For example, a requirements buyer
cannot, consistent with good faith duties, acquire goods or substitutes
elsewhere (thus constructively terminating the contract in whole or in
part) when the market price falls below the contract price; 3 an out-
put seller cannot reduce its output because a contract becomes un-
profitable;" 4 a lender improperly tries to recapture opportunities
foregone at the time of contracting when it terminates a construction
line of credit because it decides to stop making construction loans
108. Id. at 1365.
109. Id. at 1373. The court also found this conduct to be in subjective bad faith and,
therefore, awarded punitive damages. Id.
110. 445 F. Supp. 927 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
111. Id. at 938-39.
112. See, e.g., Caton v. Leach Corp., 896 F.2d 939, 946-47 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that,
under California law, an employer violates the covenant of good faith when it denies an
employee benefits allocated under a contract); Mitford v. de Lasala, 666 P.2d 1000, 1006-
07 (Alaska 1983) (finding bad faith when an employer fired its employee to prevent him
from sharing in future profits); Maddaloni v. Western Mass. Bus Lines, Inc., 438 N.E.2d
351, 356 (Mass. 1982) ("An employer may not discharge an employee in order to avoid the
payment of commissions or to reap for itself financial benefits due its employee."); Hall v.
Farmers Ins. Exch., 713 P.2d 1027, 1031 (Okla. 1985) ("[A] principal may not unfairly
deprive his agent of the fruits of that agent's own labor by a wrongful, unwarranted resort
to a clause in the agency contract which provides for termination at will."). Other courts
have found public policy exceptions to an employer's discretion to terminate an at-will
employee. See, e.g., McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 779 S.W.2d 69, 71 (Tex. 1989)
(holding that firing an employee to avoid making a contribution to the pension fund is
actionable when public policy supports such funds).
113. BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 6, at 135-36 (citing Loudenback Fertilizer Co. v.
Tennessee Phosphate Co., 121 F. 298 (6th Cir. 1903)).
114. Id. at 136 (citing Empire Gas Corp. v. American Bakeries Co., 840 F.2d 1333 (7th
Cir. 1988); Feld v. Henry S. Levy & Sons, Inc., 335 N.E.2d 320 (N.Y. 1975)).
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generally;" 5 and a party breaches the covenant of good faith when it
indirectly terminates a contract by taking actions to undermine the
business arrangement so as to make more money by pursuing other
deals.'1 6
This is not to say that parties in their agreement cannot give each
other broad discretion to terminate.117 In such cases, the implied cov-
enant of good faith should not be used "as a tool for rewriting the
parties' Agreement based on unspecified notions of fairness.""' Nev-
ertheless, "too quick a reliance on express terms, literally construed,
can do violence to the intentions and reasonable expectations of the
parties."1'19 Rather, express terms must be "interpreted in accordance
with any course of performance, course of dealing, usage of trade, and
similar contextual features shaping the reasonable expectations of the
parties arising from their promises. "120
2. Application of Common Law Principles to Government Contracts.-
Application of common law precedent to the federal contracts termi-
nation setting would eliminate confusion in the federal law by impos-
ing the same duties on a government agency as are imposed on a
private contracting party. Application of the common law would
(1) impose an objective, rather than a subjective, test of whether the
government acted in good faith, reaffirming that the government
does not have discretion to walk away from its bargains with impunity;
(2) reject the implication in some cases that the government must
premeditate a contract breach in order to abuse its termination dis-
cretion; (3) eliminate the well-nigh irrefragable standard imposed
only on those contracting with the government; and (4) provide a
firmer conceptual framework for those cases finding bad faith by the
government in terminating.
a. Subjective Bad Faith.-The plurality opinion in Torncello is
consistent with common law good faith precedent in many respects.
The explication of the purposes and understandings of the parties
115. BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 6, at 161-62 (citing First Nat'l Bank v. Sylvester,
554 N.E.2d 1063 (1990)).
116. See Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Butch Lewis Prods., Inc., 808 P.2d 919, 924 (Nev. 1991);
Sons of Thunder, Inc. v. Borden, Inc., No. A-37, 1997 WL 104592, at *14-16 (NJ. Mar. 11,
1997).
117. See Tomcello v. United States, 681 F.2d 756, 771 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (en banc).
118. General Aviation, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 703 F. Supp. 637, 644 (W.D. Mich.
1988).
119. BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 6, at 145.
120. Id. at 130; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203 (1981) ("[E]xpress
terms are given greater weight than course of performance, course of dealing, and usage of
trade.").
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with respect to the use of termination-for-convenience clauses pro-
vides the substance of the justified expectations of the parties. More-
over, common law precedent would not permit the termination-for-
convenience clause to be used to remake the contract simply to get
out of a bad deal or to take advantage of a better deal, whether known
before or discovered after the contract was executed.12 1 Common law
precedent also supports the conclusion that, if the termination-for-
convenience clause gives the government an unfettered right of excul-
pation, the contract is illusory, a contract interpretation not favored in
the law.'
22
The Torncello plurality deviated from common law precedent in
an important respect by continuing to adhere to the rule that, in or-
der to upset the government's termination for convenience, a contrac-
tor must show that the government acted in subjective bad faith. 23 In
order to denigrate the government's ability to provide effective con-
sideration for a termination-for-convenience right, 124 the plurality
painted in the starkest possible terms the difficulty a contractor faces
in proving subjective bad faith. 125 What the TornceUo plurality should
have done was recognize that the government has the same good faith
duties as a private party and that the government cannot exercise its
discretion to terminate contrary to the justified expectations of the
parties, or to recapture an opportunity foreclosed at the time of con-
tracting. 126 These justified expectations might very well not substan-
121. BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 6, at 80.
122. See United States v. Winstar Corp., 116 S. Ct. 2432, 2477 (1996) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in the judgment) (interpreting a government contract in order to prevent it from
being illusory); Walsh v. Schlecht, 429 U.S. 401, 408 (1977) (noting that a general rule of
construction presumes the legality and enforceability of contracts); Maxima Corp. v.
United States, 847 F.2d 1549, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (stating that, if possible, a government
contract will not be construed to lack consideration and mutuality).
123. Torncello v. United States, 681 F.2d 756, 772 (CL Cl. 1982) (plurality opinion) (en
banc). The Court of Federal Claims recently read post-Tomnello Federal Circuit precedent
to require actual subjective bad faith by the procurement officials involved. See Advanced
Materials, Inc. v. United States, 34 Fed. Cl. 480, 482-83 (1995).
124. As Judge Davis pointed out, the To'ncello plurality probably exaggerated the diffi-
culty a contractor faces in trying to prove subjective bad faith in an attempt to negative any
effective consideration. Tornceo, 681 F.2d at 773-74 (Davis, J., concurring in the result).
125. Id. at 767-77 (plurality opinion).
126. While Judge Bennett, writing for the Torncello plurality, stated that "the govern-
ment's obligation to act in good faith hardly functions as the meaningful obligation that it
may be for private persons," he defined the government's "good faith" obligation, based
on his reading of prior precedent, as solely not to act in subjective bad faith. Id. at 771
(plurality opinion). In that sense, Judge Bennett was right that a good faith obligation
defined in such a restrictive sense is inconsistent with common law precedent governing
private parties. The appropriate common law rule, which should be applied in the federal
contracting context as well, is illustrated in Martin v. Prier Brass Manufacturing Co., 710
S.W.2d 466 (Mo. CL App. 1986). In Martin, the court held that a contract giving the ulti-
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tially confine the government, as the government's discretion to
terminate is stated broadly. 27 Nevertheless, the good faith limits ex-
tend at least so far as not to permit the government to get out of a
deal merely because its bargain might have turned sour or because it
can avail itself of an even better opportunity to acquire the same
goods or services.
Although the government has retained broad discretion to termi-
nate under the standard termination-for-convenience clause when it is
in its interest to do so, the government's obligation of good faith still
restricts the exercise of that discretion to the justified expectations of
the parties.1 28 Government contractors acquire their justified expec-
tations, at least in part, from the purpose of the standard termination-
for-convenience clause. That purpose, as noted by the Torncello plural-
ity, is to deal with changed or unexpected circumstances relating to
the need for the product or services. 'I Unless the parties expressly so
state in their agreement, however, those expectations should never be
assumed to include the right to avoid the contract simply because it
turned out to be a bad bargain or because an even better bargain
came along.13 0
mate power of interpretation to one party does not make an executed contract illusory
because that power must be exercised in good faith so as not "to evade the spirit of the
transaction or... deny the other party the expected benefit of the contract." Id. at 473; cf
Aviation Contractor Employees, Inc. v. United States, 945 F.2d 1568, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(stating that a contract with uncertain terms to be decided at a later date is sufficiently
defined because the parties have an implied duty to negotiate in good faith).
127. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
128. ToreUo, 681 F.2d at 771 (plurality opinion).
129. The Torncello plurality stated:
[C]onvenience termination, as it was developing, was intended just to handle
changed conditions, relieving the government of the risk of receiving obsolete or
useless goods.... The contractor risked losing the full benefit of his perform-
ance if something occurred, apart from the bargain and the expectations of the paties,
that made continuance of the contract clearly inadvisable.
Id. at 765-66 (emphasis added).
130. See id. at 772 (stating that the government may not terminate a contract to obtain a
better price of which it had knowledge at the time the contract was formed); Municipal
Leasing Corp. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 43, 47 (1984) ("The termination for convenience
clause can appropriately be invoked only in the event of some kind of change from the
circumstances of the bargain or in the expectations of the parties."); Tamp Corp., 84-2
B.CA. (CCH) 1 17,460 at 86,977-78 (1984) (finding that the government did not act in
good faith when it extended a contract for two months with the knowledge that it would
terminate a month later when a better price would become available). If an agreement
permitted the government an "out" for any and every reason, however, the agreement
would likely fail for want of mutuality of obligation. See Torncelo, 681 F.2d at 769 (plurality
opinion) ("It is hornbook law ... that a route of complete escape vitiates any other consid-
eration furnished and is incompatible with the existence of a contract." (citing 1 SAMUEL
WILLISrON, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF CONTRAcrS § 104 (3d ed. 1957); 1 ARTHUR LIt'rON
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CoNrr.ACTS § 145 (1963)).
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Supreme Court precedent amply supports this conclusion. In
United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co.,13 1 the Court stated: "Of
course, the Government could not avoid the contract merely because
it turned out to be a bad bargain."182  Common law and common
sense, as well as equity, lead to the same conclusion.
1 33
b. Premeditated Breach.-In his Torncello concurrence, Judge
Davis suggested that it might be appropriate for the government to
use the termination-for-convenience clause to take advantage of a bet-
ter deal that later came to its attention.1 3 4 More recently, in Caldwell
& Santmyer, Inc. v. Glickman'35 and Krygoski Construction Co. v. United
States,"8 6 the Federal Circuit similarly suggested that the government
has not breached its duty of good faith unless it knew "full well," at the
time of contracting, that it would not honor the contract.1 3 7 These sug-
gestions run directly counter to the common law and would allow the
government to get out of a deal whenever it wants to do so. Either
such a broad "right" to terminate will always be in violation of the
justified expectations of the parties, or no contract will exist because it
is illusory.1 3
It is conceded in government contracts law that having a precon-
ceived intent to breach the contract is to terminate in subjective bad
faith.1 39 When the objective test of good faith duties is applied, how-
ever-measuring the discretion-exercising party's conduct by the justi-
fied expectations of the parties-the moment when a party forms the
improper intent to abuse its discretion is no more relevant to a breach
of the covenant of good faith than it is to the breach of any other
contractual covenant. 4°
131. 364 U.S. 520 (1961).
132. Id at 565-66 (citing Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66-67 (1945)).
133. BURTON & ANDERSr, supra note 6, at 91-95.
134. Tornce14 681 F.2d at 774 (Davis, J., concurring in the result).
135. 55 F.3d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
136. 94 F.3d 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 65 U.S.L.W. 3571 (U.S. May 12, 1997)
(No. 96-1236).
137. Caldwell 55 F.3d at 1582; Kygosk, 94 F.3d at 1544.
138. See Torncello, 681 F.2d at 768-69 (plurality opinion); see also RPSTATFMENT (SECOND)
OF CoNrrRAcrs § 77 (1981) ("A promise or apparent promise is not consideration if by its
terms the promisor or purported promisor reserves a choice of alternative
performances.").
139. See Caldwell, 55 F.3d at 1582.
140. Only two of the six Torncello judges rested their decisions on the basis that the
agency had premeditated the breach. See Torncello, 681 F.2d at 773 (Friedman, C.J., con-
curring); i at 773-74 (Davis, J., concurring in the result). That basis was, however, de-
fined (incorrectly) by the Federal Circuit as the central rationale of the decision. See
Kiygoski, 94 F.3d at 1541-42 (stating that Torncello "overruled Colonial Metals because the
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No party would be allowed to escape the consequences of a typi-
cal breach by arguing that it did not intend to breach at the time of
contracting, even though it later did so, either innocently or inten-
tionally. 14 The same rule should apply to a breach of the covenant of
good faith in the government contracts termination context.
c. Well-Nigh Irrefragable Proof.-In the termination of con-
tracts, an acknowledgement that the government is subject to the
same good faith duties as a private party would eliminate the well-nigh
irrefragable burden of proof now imposed on government contrac-
tors. This burden of proof has been imposed only when the good
faith duties of the government have been equated with not acting in
subjective bad faith. 42 Government contractors have not been re-
quired to show subjective bad faith in other situations involving good
faith duties. 4
Even under a continuing subjective-bad-faith regime, the well-
nigh irrefragable standard has little to commend it except its frequent
repetition. Well-nigh irrefragable (or in more common parlance, "al-
most indisputable") is not a standard commonly found in the law and
is not a standard that has been defined, except on a case-by-case basis,
in government contracts law. 1" Although commentators have sug-
gested that well-nigh irrefragable is the functional equivalent of a
"clear and convincing" standard, 45 the case law has not made that
identification.
Navy used the termination for convenience clause to escape a promise it never had an
intention to keep").
141. See, e.g., Ideker, Inc. v. Missouri State Highway Comm'n, 654 S.W.2d 617, 624 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1983) (stating that scenter is not an element of a cause of action for breach of
contract warranty).
142. See supra notes 123-127 and accompanying text.
143. See, e.g., Malone v. United States, 849 F.2d 1441, 1445 (Fed. Cir.) (holding that a
government contracting officer's evasiveness and resulting interference with the contrac-
tor's performance amounted to a material breach of contract), modified, 857 F.2d 787 (Fed.
Cir. 1988); Neal & Co., Inc. v. United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 600, 631 (1996) (finding that the
government's failure to issue a timely direction can breach the duty to cooperate); Thomas
S. Rhoades & Stephen L. Schluneger, 95-1 B.CA (CCH) 27,375 at 136,436-37 (1994)
(affirming that the government has an affirmative duty to cooperate with the contractor);
see also Marine Constr. & Dredging, Inc., 95-1 B.CA (CCH) 27,286 at 136,026 (1994)
(recognizing that proving subjective bad faith "requires more than showing that the con-
tracting officer breached duties of 'good faith' and 'fair dealing' in administering the
contract").
144. See infra notes 146-206 and accompanying text.
145. See, e.g., Toomey et al., supra note 29, at 92 (stating that by "well-nigh irrefragable,"
Knotts v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 630 (Ct. Cl. 1954), the court seemed to mean that
contractors have the burden of showing bad faith by clear and convincing evidence).
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The well-nigh irrefragable standard found its initial expression in
the 1954 Court of Claims decision of Knotts v. United States1 "-an em-
ployee discharge case. 147 The standard has since been applied in
more common government contracts cases without critical discus-
sion.1" The only scrap of rationale provided by the case law for this
higher, but largely undefined, well-nigh irrefragable standard is that
government agents are presumed to act in good faith.14 9 The sup-
posed distinction between government agents and private actors, how-
ever, is unfounded. 5 ' Private parties are also presumed to act in
good faith, and as is true with respect to other alleged contract
breaches, the party asserting the breach of good faith duties has the
burden of proof."' Indeed, in other government contracts situations
in which the government is held to good faith duties, although the
burden is on the contractor to show a breach of those duties, a well-
nigh irrefragable standard is rightfully not imposed. 52
Most important, imposing a heightened, well-nigh irrefragable
standard cannot be squared with the bedrock principle that the
United States, upon entering the marketplace, is held to the same
standards as a private citizen.15 3 Further, imposing a heightened stan-
146. 121 F. Supp. 630 (Ct. Cl. 1954).
147. Id. at 630.
148. See, e.g., Caldwell & Santmyer, Inc. v. Glickman, 55 F.3d 1578, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(reciting the well-nigh irrefragable proof standard without analysis); Torncello v. United
States, 681 F.2d 756, 770-71 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (plurality opinion) (en banc) (same); Kalvar
Corp. v. United States, 543 F.2d 1298, 1301-02 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (same).
149. See Caldwe/l, 55 F.3d at 1581 ("We assume the government acts in good faith when
contracting."); Torncel/o, 681 F.2d at 770 (plurality opinion) (stating that "the government,
unlike private parties, is assumed always to act in good faith"); Librach v. United States, 147
Ct. Cl. 605, 612 (1959) ("[I]n the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, it must be
presumed that the public officials involved in the termination of the plaintiffs' contract
were acting conscientiously... when the contract was terminated for the purported con-
venience of the Government.").
150. No common law precedent is cited in the government contracts cases for the incor-
rect premise that private contractors are not presumed to act in good faith.
151. BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 6, at 107. Recently, the Court of Federal Claims in
Huna Totem Cop. v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 603 (1996), while uncritically applying the
well-nigh irrefragable standard, also correctly noted that "there is a presumption that both
parties have fulfilled their duties of good faith and fair dealing." Id. at 613.
152. See, e.g., Malone v. United States, 849 F.2d 1441, 1445 (Fed. Cir.) (imposing the
common law preponderance standard on a contractor to prove the government's breach
of good faith duties during performance and not discussing the well-nigh irrefragable stan-
dard), modified, 857 F.2d 787 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Pacific Far East Line, Inc. v. United States,
394 F.2d 990, 998 (Ct. Cl. 1968) (per curiam) (adopting the opinion of the trial commis-
sioner that the government must exercise its contractual discretion reasonably and not
arbitrarily or capriciously); see also Toomey et al., supra note 29, at 118-24 (discussing the
importance of Maione and government contracts tribunals not using the well-nigh irrefra-
gable proof standard in nontermination cases).
153. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
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dard on the contractor runs contrary to those decisions which prop-
erly hold that, if anything, the government should be held to higher
good faith duties than a private party, considering its power in the
marketplace and its status as representative of the people.' 54 The gov-
ernment has "an ever present obligation to perform its duties under a
contract reasonably and in good faith,""' and it "must be held to the
same general principles of equity and fair play in dealing with those
who contract with it as are the contractors themselves."' 56 The well-
nigh irrefragable standard does not define the duties of private con-
tractors, and neither should it define the duties of the government as
a contracting party.
d. Existing Federal Precedent.-This is not to say that those
cases which have found the government to have acted in subjective
bad faith or to have abused its discretion in a termination setting have
been wrongly decided or that they are wholly irrelevant. Under the
common law, wrongful motives may well indicate a breach of good
faith duties, 157 although an absence of wrongful reasons "does not suf-
fice to establish good faith because bad faith may also consist of action
for reasons that are disallowed by the contract even though not
wrongful." 58 Many government contracts tribunals have reached an
appropriate result under common law precedent by finding that when
the government terminates just to avail itself of a better deal, it vio-
lates the "subjective bad faith/abuse of discretion" standard.
In Municipal Leasing Corp. v. United States,'59 for example, the Air
Force had expressed its binding intent to purchase computer termi-
nals for a base year and for option years from the contractor. i' ° At
the time of contracting, the Air Force had rejected the alternative of
repairing its existing Hazeltine terminals.' 61 After the base year, the
Air Force breached its obligation by not seeking additional funding to
allow exercise of the option and by pursuing, instead, the repair of the
154. See, e.g., Corliss Steam-Engine Co. v. United States, 10 CL Cl. 494, 502 (1874) (not-
ing that the government must deal with a contractor "in the strictest fairness and justice"),
afftd, 91 U.S. 321 (1875); R & R Enters., 89-2 B.CA (CCH) 1 21,708 at 109,148 (1989)
("[B]ecause of its size, power, and potential ability to manipulate the market place, the
Government may have obligations of fairness beyond those of the ordinary citizen.").
155. ASCO-Falcon II Shipping Co. v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 484, 492 (1989).
156. Kemp v. United States, 38 F. Supp. 568, 570 (D. Md. 1941).
157. BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 6, at 77.
158. Id. at 77-78.
159. 7 Cl. Ct. 43 (1984).
160. Id. at 44.
161. Id.
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Hazeltine terminals. 6 ' The court rejected the Air Force's attempt to
justify its conduct under a constructive termination theory:
The termination for convenience clause can appropri-
ately be invoked only in the event of some kind of change
from the circumstances of the bargain or in the expectations
of the parties. In this instance, the government promised
that it would not replace the leased terminals with function-
ally equivalent equipment.... The termination for conven-
ience clause will not act as a constructive shield to protect
[the government] from the consequences of its decision to
follow an option considered but rejected before contracting
with plaintiff. 6
Moreover, government contracts tribunals' various formulations
of subjective bad faith-"specific intent to injure" the contractor, 1
actions "motivated alone by malice,"165 and "designedly oppressive"
conduct' 6-when properly construed, all come into play when the
government attempts to recapture opportunities knowingly given up
at the time of contracting. For example, the ASBCA found "specific
intent to injure" a contractor when Navy personnel disagreed with the
decision to privatize what had been an operation handled by Navy
employees and wanted the old regime reinstated. 6 The Board found
that the Navy personnel acted in subjective, as well as objective, bad
faith by sabotaging the private contractor's performance, even though
the Navy employees were not motivated by animosity toward the par-
ticular contractor."6 Indeed, while malice connotes willfulness, it
does not require personal ill will, but merely intentional action for a
wrongful purpose to gain some advantage at the other party's ex-
162. Id.
163. Id. at 47 (citations omitted); see also Operational Serv. Corp., 93-3 B.CA. (CCH)
1 26,190 at 130,374 (1993) (disallowing a termination when the agency switched to an-
other company of which it had full knowledge at the time of contracting); Tamp Corp., 84-
2 B.CA (CCH) 1 17,460 at 86,977-78 (1984) (setting aside an attempted termination for
convenience when the agency and the contractor specifically negotiated for a two-month
extension and the agency then terminated after one month).
164. See Kalvar Corp. v. United States, 543 F.2d 1298, 1301-02 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
165. See id; Marine Constr. & Dredging, Inc., 95-1 B.CA (CCH) 1 27,286 at 136,026
(1994); Apex Int'l Management Servs., Inc., 94-2 B.CA (CCH) 1 26,842 at 133,550, aff'd
on reconsideration, 94-2 B.CA (CCH) 26,852 at 133,622 (1994).
166. See Kalvar, 543 F.2d at 1302; Struck Constr. Co. v. United States, 96 Ct. Cl. 186, 220-
22 (1942); Marine Constr., 95-1 B.CA (CCH) at 136,026; Apex, 94-2 B.CA (CCH) at
133,550.
167. See Apex 94-2 B.CA (CCH) at 133,550.
168. See id. at 133,548-50.
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pense. 169 Thus, in many instances, applying the subjective bad faith/
abuse of discretion standard will yield the same result as applying
common law precedent.
e. Summary.-The law governing termination of govern-
ment contracts should conform with the general principle that the
government has the same rights and responsibilities as a private
party."0 The law should expressly recognize that when the govern-
ment exercises its discretion to terminate for convenience it must ex-
ercise that discretion in good faith, as defined in the common law.
Whether the government acted in subjective bad faith, although
often relevant, is not the dispositive inquiry. The proper test is an
objective one: If the government terminates within its discretion as
defined by the justified expectations of the parties at the time they
made their bargain, the termination is in good faith; if the govern-
ment tries to recapture an opportunity foreclosed at the time of con-
tracting, it acts in bad faith.
Whether the government contemplated breaching its good faith
duties in advance of contracting is also not dispositive of the inquiry.
A party does not have to premeditate a breach before actually forming
a contract in order to be found later to have breached its obligations,
regardless of whether the party breached innocently or intentionally.
This recent, restrictive reading of Torncello v. United States17' by the
Federal Circuit'72 most probably stems from the fact that the special-
169. See Bitterman v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 207 U.S. 205, 223 (1907) (stating that
personal ill will is not required for malice in law, only wanton disregard of the rights of the
other to gain personal advantage); Getschow v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 444 N.E.2d,
579, 584 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) ("It is also well settled that 'malice,' when used in this context,
does not require a showing of ill will, hostility or an intent to injure."), affid in part and rev'd
in part, 459 N.E.2d 1332 (Ill. 1984); Coleman v. Whisnant, 35 S.E.2d 647, 656 (N.C. 1945)
("The word 'malicious' used in referring to malicious interference with formation of a
contract does not import ill will, but refers to an interference with design of injury to
plaintiff or gaining some advantage at his expense."); see also In re Posta, 866 F.2d 364, 367-
68 (10th Cir. 1989) (stating that "malicious" intent under the Bankruptcy Code may be
proven by either direct evidence of specific intent to injure or, "[m] ore commonly, . . . by
evidence that the debtor had knowledge of the creditor's rights and.., proceeded to take
action in violation of those rights"); Morey v. Page, 802 S.W.2d 779, 787 (Tex. App. 1990)
(finding that knowing conversion of property is malicious); BALLENTINE'S LAw DICrIONARY
768 (3d ed. 1969) (defining malice as an "improper motive, not necessarily positive malig-
nity; a wilful disregard of the rights of another, whether in accomplishing an unlawful
purpose or a lawful purpose by an unlawful means"); BLACK'S LAW DCTIONARY 956-57 (6th
ed. 1990) ("Malice in law is not necessarily personal hate or ill will.").
170. See United States v. Winstar Corp., 116 S. Ct. 2432, 2464-65 (1996) (plurality
opinion).
171. 681 F.2d 756 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (en banc).
172. See Krygoski Constr. Co. v. United States, 94 F.3d 1537, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (read-
ing Torncello to hold that the government does not act in bad faith unless it enters a con-
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ized government contracts tribunals have not articulated a proper the-
oretical framework for limiting the government's exercise of
discretion in termination situations-a theoretical framework that
common law contractual good faith precedent provides.'
73
In Caldwell & Santmyer, Inc. v. Glickman,174 the Federal Circuit
correctly held that the government's discretion to terminate for con-
venience is not restricted merely because the government is on notice
that "at some future date, it may be appropriate to terminate the con-
tract for convenience." 175 The government retains its discretion to
terminate for convenience even though it might be able to prognosti-
cate in general the reasons that such a termination might later legiti-
mately be exercised.1 76 Nevertheless, the government's discretion,
like that of a private party, should be limited by good faith, as defined
by the reasonable expectations of the parties at the time of con-
tracting. Like a private party, the government cannot, consistent with
good faith duties, recapture an opportunity foreclosed at the time of
contracting.
177
Finally, the well-nigh irrefragable proof standard imposed on gov-
ernment contractors should be scuttled because it lacks adequate
precedential, philosophical, or policy underpinning. The govern-
ment contractor, like an aggrieved party to a private contract, bears
the burden of proving a breach of good faith and most other contrac-
tual covenants. The government does not stand on a special pedestal
when it enters the marketplace.1 7 It stands on the level of the citizens
with whom it contracts: "The United States are as much bound by
their contracts as are individuals. If they repudiate their obligations, it
is as much repudiation, with all the wrong and reproach that term
tract with the intention of invoking the termination-for-convenience clause for known
conditions already in being), cert. denied, 65 U.S.L.W. 3571 (U.S. May 12, 1997) (No. 96-
1236); Caldwell & Santmyer, Inc. v. Glickman, 55 F.3d 1578, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (read-
ing Tornello similarly in dicta).
173. BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 6, at 52-60.
174. 55 F.3d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
175. Id. at 1582.
176. See Krygosk4 94 F.3d at 1544-45.
177. BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 6, at 45, 52-57. In Nesbitt v. United States, 345 F.2d
583 (Ct. Cl. 1965), as in Colonial Metals Co. v. United States, 494 F.2d 1355 (CL Cl. 1974) (per
curiam), the Court of Claims apparently validated an agency's ability simply to walk away
from its requirements contract. Nesbitt 345 F.2d at 586. A close reading of the facts in
Nesbitt reveals, however, that the contractor was unable and unwilling to meet the agency's
total requirements. See id. Therefore, a partial constructive termination by placing some
of the work elsewhere was appropriate. See id. at 586 n.3.
178. See Cooke v. United States, 91 U.S. 389, 398 (1875) (stating that when the United
States "comes down from its position of sovereignty, and enters the domain of commerce,
it submits itself to the same laws that govern individuals there").
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implies, as it would be if the repudiator had been a State or a munici-
pality or a citizen."' 79
III. GOOD FAITH IN THE FORMATION OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
The other area in which government contracts law has deviated
from the common law of good faith duties is contract formation. Gov-
ernment contracts law recognizes, as does the common law, good faith
duties in the negotiation of agreements."" Yet federal tribunals have
stopped short of affording government contractors the full relief to
which they are entitled when the government fails to negotiate a con-
tract in good faith.
A. Common Law Good Faith Duties in Contract Negotiation
and Formation
American law imposes no general duty to negotiate a
contract in good faith .... [American courts] continue to
view contract negotiations as, at bottom, an undertaking in
which self-interest is the accepted norm. Each party assumes
the risk that, despite a heavy investment in the negotiation
process, no agreement will be reached."8
This American rule of law that good faith duties do not pertain
during precontract negotiations is often modified by "preliminary
179. Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 719 (1879). The Court in Lynch v. United States,
292 U.S. 571 (1934), similarly declared:
Punctilious fulfillment of contractual obligations is essential to the maintenance
of the credit of public as well as private debtors. No doubt there was in March,
1933, great need of economy. In the administration of all government business
economy had become urgent because of lessened revenues and the heavy obliga-
tions to be issued in the hope of relieving widespread distress. Congress was free
to reduce gratuities deemed excessive. But Congress was without power to reduce
expenditures by abrogating contractual obligations of the United States. To abro-
gate contracts, in the attempt to lessen government expenditure, would be not
the practice of economy, but an act of repudiation.
Id. at 580.
180. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
181. BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 6, at 330-31. Burton and Andersen cite as illustra-
tive the following passage from Feldman v. Allegheny Internaiona Inc., 850 F.2d 1217 (7th
Cir. 1988):
In a business transaction both sides presumably try to get the best of the deal.
That is the essence of bargaining and the free market. ... So one cannot charac-
terize self-interest as bad faith. No particular demand in negotiations could be
termed dishonest, even if it seemed outrageous to the other party. The proper
recourse is to walk away from the bargaining table, not to sue for "bad faith" in
negotiations.
BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 6, at 331 & n.5 (quoting Feldman, 850 F.2d at 1223).
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agreements" between the parties."' A preliminary agreement is "one
made during bargaining on the assumption that further negotiations
will take place and result in a later, final contract."1 8 3 Burton and
Andersen note that, "in most cases, preliminary agreements include at
least an implicit obligation to make efforts to reach that further agree-
ment .... [S]uch agreements set out procedural rules for subsequent
negotiations, or settle (even if only for purposes of negotiation) some
of the substantive terms of the final contract, or both."181 The parties
must, of course, intend to be bound by their preliminary agreement
for it to have contractual effect,"8 5 and even if they intend to be
bound, their contract is not enforceable if it is so indefinite that,
should the court enforce it, it would lock the parties into "'surprise
contractual obligations that they never intended.'" 8 6 Although Bur-
ton and Andersen hold as the "better view ... that a general duty to
negotiate, without more, is too indefinite to be enforced,"187 the more
the parties delineate procedural rules and define specific terms in
their preliminary agreement, the more likely the agreement is to be
definite and enforceable with attendant good faith duties: "When the
parties have agreed to treat some final contract terms as settled, the
good faith performance obligation supplies workable boundaries to
the general duty to negotiate. It provides a well-developed means of
distinguishing performance from breach, satisfying the requirement
of definiteness."1 8 8
In order to calculate the measure of damages for breach of a pre-
liminary agreement, Professor Farnsworth has argued that "expecta-
tion" damages (lost profits) are always inappropriate because the
parties were foreclosed from entering into the "larger agreement" by
the breach of the preliminary agreement. 189 He argues that as there
is "no way of knowing what the terms of the ultimate agreement would
have been, or even whether the parties would have arrived at an ulti-
182. BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 6, at 347-48. Burton and Andersen also note that
the common law rule that there are no good faith obligations in negotiation is policed by
the theories of duress, coercion, fraud, misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, and promis-
sory estoppel. IM at 335-47.
183. Md at 348-49.
184. 1& at 348.
185. 1& at 353.
186. Id. at 359 (quoting Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Tribune Co., 670
F. Supp. 491, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)).
187. Id. at 360 (citing Pinnacle Books, Inc. v. Harlequin Enters. Ltd., 519 F. Supp. 118,
122 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)).
188. Id. at 362.
189. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair Deal-
ing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 217, 263 (1987).
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mate agreement,. . . there is no possibility of a claim for lost expecta-
tion under such an agreement."19 ° Thus, under Farnsworth's
rationale, only restitutionary, out-of-pocket damages are available for
breach of a preliminary agreement.1 91
Burton and Andersen reject Farnsworth's reasoning as an abso-
lute rule, as does the emerging consensus of common law jurispru-
dence. 92 Although in many cases lost profits cannot be awarded
because the terms of the final contract are too indefinite, Burton and
Andersen point out that in many cases "it is practical and appropriate
to allow expectation damages based on the potential, but unrealized,
final contract."' 9 They identify the key issue as being whether a court
can determine what economic benefit the injured party would have
realized had the final contract been executed.' 94 "Thus, when the
parties have worked out many of the principal economic terms of
their final contract in detail, there is no obstacle to allowing expecta-
tion damages based on the bargain tentatively agreed to, but not con-
summated."195 When expectation interest can be ascertained with
certainty, the courts have awarded expectation damages for breach of
a preliminary agreement in various settings, including loan agree-
ments,' 96 a sale/sale-back of commercial aircraft,' a commercial
lease,' 98 a manufacturing contract, 9 and a subcontract to design and
190. Id.
191. SeeRESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 (1981) (labeling as "reliance" dam-
ages what many courts refer to as the "restitutionary" measure); see also Acme Process
Equip. Co. v. United States, 347 F.2d 509, 530 (Ct. CI. 1965) (allowing for reliance dam-
ages as defined in Restatement (Second) of Contracts, supra, yet declaring the damages "restitu-
don"), rev'd on other grounds, 385 U.S. 138 (1966).
192. BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 6, at 364-66.
193. Id. at 364.
194. Id. at 365.
195. Id.
196. See, e.g., Teachers Ins. &AnnuityAss'n of Am. v. Coaxial Communications, Inc., 799
F. Supp. 16, 18-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (awarding expectation damages for breach of a loan
commitment); Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Ormesa Geothermal, 791 F. Supp.
401, 415-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (same); Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Butler, 626 F.
Supp. 1229, 1236 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (same).
197. See, e.g., Cauff, Lippman & Co. v. Apogee Fin. Group, Inc., 807 F. Supp. 1007, 1024
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (awarding expectation damages for breach of a preliminary agreement to
negotiate the sale/sale-back of a commercial aircraft).
198. See, e.g., Evans, Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 416 F. Supp. 224, 240-45 (N.D. Ill. 1976)
(awarding expectation damages for breach of a preliminary agreement to enter into a
commercial lease).
199. See, e.g., Milex Prods., Inc. v. Alra Lab., Inc., 603 N.E.2d 1226, 1235-37 (Il1. App. Ct.
1992) (awarding expectation damages for breach of a preliminary agreement to enter into
a manufacturing contract).
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supply radiation detection equipment to the United States Air
Force.2 o0
B. Government Contract Formation Law
Unlike common law contracts, federal government contracts are
highly regulated in their form, constituent clauses, and procedures for
award. With only rare exceptions, a government contractor must ac-
cept the contract terms as set out by the agency in the solicitation.0 l
Although technical requirements are normally tailored to a particular
contract, the large majority of government contracts clauses are speci-
fied in the FAR and are uniformly incorporated in government solici-
tations and contracts.2 °2 A qualified bidder will be disqualified if it
takes exception to any of these material terms or conditions of the
solicitation. 20 In "negotiated" solicitations, in which the quality or
technical acceptability of the proposal of the offeror is evaluated
along with the price,20 4 offerors may have more leeway to take excep-
tion to the terms and conditions of the contract. Unless the govern-
ment agrees to amend the solicitation for all offerors, however, award
must be made on the solicitation as finalized.20 5
The procedures for awarding a government contract are also
highly regulated in order to treat offerors fairly and equally.2 6 For
instance, a contract is formed only when the government's con-
tracting officer sends the bidder written notice of the award.20 7 Fur-
ther, government representatives are required to communicate the
200. See, e.g., Air Tech. Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 199 N.E.2d 538, 548 (Mass. 1964)
(awarding expectation damages for breach of a preliminary agreement to design and sup-
ply radiation detection devices).
201. See infra notes 204-205 and accompanying text (discussing "negotiated"
solicitations).
202. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. pt. 52 (1996).
203. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. § 14.301(a). To be awarded a government contract, a bidder
must be "responsive"-the bidder must conform in all material respects to the solicitation,
not taking exception to any terms and conditions. See id. In this way, the government can
ensure that all bidders are bidding on an "equal footing." See id.
204. See id. § 15.602.
205. See id. §§ 15.611(d), 15.612(d).
206. See id. § 15.603(c). The purpose of government contracts award procedures is to
treat offerors fairly and equally. SeeAirco, Inc. v. Energy Research & Dev. Admin., 528 F.2d
1294, 1297-99 (7th Cir. 1975) (per curiam); Elcon Enters., Inc. v. Washington Metro. Area
Transit Auth., 770 F. Supp. 667, 677 (D.D.C. 1991), aff'd in part and rev'd in part 977 F.2d
1472 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Howard Cooper Corp. v. United States, 763 F. Supp. 829, 837 (E.D.
Va. 1991); Dynalectron Corp. v. United States, 659 F. Supp. 64, 68-70 (D.D.C. 1987); Grum-
man Data Sys. Corp. v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 803, 805-06 (1993); Thomas Creek Lum-
ber & Log Co. v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 559, 566 (1991); Cassidy Cleaning, Inc. v. United
States, 10 Cl. Ct. 317, 319 (1986).
207. See 48 C.F.R. § 14.408-1; Professional Bldg. Concepts, Inc. v. Central Falls, 974 F.2d
1, 3-4 (Ist Cir. 1992) (per curiam); Coco Bros. v. Pierce, 741 F.2d 675, 677 (3d Cir. 1984).
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same information to all offerors,"° and if the contracting officer re-
opens negotiations with one offeror, she must reopen them with all
offerors in the competitive range.2 °9
Two judicial forums have jurisdiction over the government con-
tracts award process. Both forums ensure compliance with regula-
tions and fairness to bidders. The Court of Federal Claims, following
long-standing precedent, will enforce as an implied contract between
an offeror and the government the idea that the offeror's offer will be
considered fairly and impartially. 21° If the government breaches this
contract, the Court of Federal Claims will award the offeror its bid and
proposal costs-restitutionary damages. 11 Moreover, in the Federal
Courts Improvement Act of 1982,212 Congress granted the Court of
Federal Claims 21 Ijurisdiction to grant injunctive relief in "bid protest"
actions-when an offeror claims that it was improperly denied a con-
tract or an opportunity to compete for an award. 214 The Federal Cir-
208. See 48 C.F.R. § 15.611 (c); Prudential-MarylandJoint Venture Co. v. Lehman, 590 F.
Supp. 1390, 1408 (D.D.C. 1984); General Elec. Co. v. Seamans, 340 F. Supp. 636, 640
(D.D.C. 1972); Planning Research Corp. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 283, 298-99 (1983).
209. See 48 C.F.R. § 15.611 (c); SACO Defense Sys. Div. v. Weinberger, 806 F.2d 308, 312-
13 (1st Cir. 1986); Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Md., Inc. v. United States Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., 718 F. Supp. 80, 87 (D.D.C. 1989); Logicon, Inc. v. United States, 22 Cl. CL
776, 791-93 (1991); see also Airco, 528 F.2d at 1298 (stating that when discussions amounted
to negotiations and took place after the negotiations "cut off date," the regulations were
violated).
210. See Grumman, 28 Fed. Cl. 807-10; Tonya, Inc. v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 727, 730-
32 (1993); TRW, Inc. v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 155, 157-62 (1993); Crux Computer
Corp. v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 223, 225 (1991); Contract Custom Drapery Serv., Inc. v.
United States, 6 Cl. CL 811, 817-18 (1984); Keco Indus., Inc. v. United States, 428 F.2d
1233, 1237-40 (Ct. Cl. 1970); see also Delta Data Sys. Corp. v. Webster, 755 F.2d 938, 940
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (finding bid preparation costs after lifting a preliminary
injunction against the continuance of a contract available to an offeror that was unfairly
denied contract); B.K. Instrument, Inc. v. United States, 715 F.2d 713, 732 (2d Cir. 1983)
(ordering bid costs if reselection process is not possible); M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans,
455 F.2d 1289, 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (stating that the court has discretion to award bid
preparation costs or injunction); see infra note 224.
211. See Grumman, 28 Fed. Cl. at 807-10; Keco, 428 F.2d at 1240.
212. Pub. L No. 97-164, 96 Star. 25 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C. and other tides).
213. As originally enacted, the name of the Court of Federal Claims was the Claims
Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1994). The name was changed in 1992 by the Court of Fed-
eral Claims Technical and Procedural Improvements Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572,
§ 902, 106 Stat. 4516 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 and 41 U.S.C.).
214. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(3). This provision provided as follows:
To afford complete relief on any contract claim brought before the contract is
awarded, the court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to grant declaratory judg-
ments and such equitable and extraordinary relief as it deems proper, including
but not limited to injunctive relief. In exercising this jurisdiction, the court shall
give due regard to the interests of national defense and national security.
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cuit has found that the jurisdictional basis for granting this relief still
lies under the Tucker Act215 as an asserted breach of the implied cove-
nant to treat a bidder fairly and impartially.216 The Federal Circuit
had also held that the authority of the Court of Federal Claims to
grant injunctive relief was limited to decisions brought prior to the
award of a contract to any offeror under the challenged
procurement.21
7
Congress recently amended the Tucker Act in the Administrative
Dispute Resolution Act of 1996218 to clarify that the Court of Federal
Claims has jurisdiction to hear bid protest actions whether or not a
contract has been awarded under the challenged procurement.21 9
Congress did not alter the operative language in section 1491 of the
Judicial Code, which states that the Court of Federal Claims "shall
have jurisdiction" in bid protest actions;220 so it seems likely that the
215. 28 U.S.C. § 1491. In particular, bid protest jurisdiction in the Court of Federal
Claims has been held to stem from section 1491 (a). See United States v. John C. Grimberg
Co., 702 F.2d 1362, 1374-77 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (en banc).
216. See Grimberg 702 F.2d at 1367.
217. See id. at 1377; see also F. Alderete Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 715 F.2d
1476, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding that the court had jurisdiction to hear the case filed
before a contract under the challenged procurement was awarded); Golden Eagle Ref. Co.
v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 613, 618-20 (1984) (same). The Federal Circuit's interpretations
in Grimberg of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 were widely criticized. See Fred-
erick W. Claybrook, Jr., The Federal Courts Improvement Act Needs Improvement: A Renewed Call
for Its Amendment, 21 PUB. CoNT. L.J. 1, 2 n.3 (1991) (citing articles).
218. Pub. L. No. 104-320, 110 Stat. 3870.
219. Id. § 12(a), 110 Stat. at 3874-75. Section 12(a) of the Administrative Dispute Reso-
lution Act of 1996 strikes previous subsection 1491 (a) (3) of the Judicial Code, redesignates
previous subsection 1491(b) as 1491(c), and adds the following new subsection 1491(b):
(b) (1) Both the Unites [sic] States Court of Federal Claims and the district
courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to render judgment on an ac-
tion by an interested party objecting to a solicitation by a Federal agency for bids
or proposals for a proposed contract or to a proposed award or the award of a
contract or any alleged violation of statute or regulation in connection with a
procurement or a proposed procurement. Both the United States Court of Fed-
eral Claims and the district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to
entertain such an action without regard to whether suit is instituted before or
after the contract is awarded.
(2) To afford relief in such an action, the courts may award any relief that the
court considers proper, including declaratory and injunctive relief except that
any monetary relief shall be limited to bid preparation and proposal costs.
(3) In exercising jurisdiction under this subsection, the courts shall give due regard
to the interests of national defense and national security and the need for expeditious
resolution of the action.
(4) In any action under this subsection, the courts shall review the agency's decision pur-
suant to the standards set forth in section 706 of title 5.
Id. § 12(a).
220. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (a) (3) (1994) ("shall have exclusive jurisdiction"), uith 28
U.S.CA § 1491(b)(1) (Supp. 1997) ("shall have jurisdiction").
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Federal Circuit will continue to hold, as it did in United States v. John C.
Grimberg Co.,"' that the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims to
hear bid protest cases is found in section 1491 (a), which gives that
court jurisdiction to hear contract breach cases. 2  Whatever its
source of jurisdiction, however, the Court of Federal Claims has con-
sistently defined its task in bid protest cases as to determine if the
bidder was treated fairly and equally.223
The federal district courts also monitor the federal contracts
award process. Although, as a general rule, they may not grant con-
tract breach damages, 24 they, too, will grant injunctive relief in ap-
propriate situations225 and now have authority to grant the monetary
relief of bid preparation and proposal costs. 226 These cases, often
called "Scanwell' actions-after the lead case of Scanwell Laboratories,
Inc. v. Shaffe7 27 -grant standing under the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA) 22s to a "disappointed bidder" to challenge the propriety of
the award process. 2 ' The well-known review standard of section 10 of
221. 702 F.2d 1362, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (en banc).
222. The reasoning of the Federal Circuit in Grimberg that section 1491(a)(3) (now
(b) (1)) is not jurisdictional is questionable. See Claybrook, supra note 217, at 16-19.
Whether the Federal Circuit will abandon this reading of the section if district and other
circuit courts find new section 1491 (b)(1) to be jurisdictional, which seems entirely likely,
remains to be seen.
223. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
224. Congress has placed exclusive jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims and the
boards of contract appeals to grant damages for a breach of contract. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491;
41 U.S.C. § 607 (1994). The only exception until recently was that, under the "Little
Tucker Act," federal district courts have concurrent original jurisdiction with the United
States Court of Federal Claims and the boards to grant contract breach damages under
$10,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2). Under section 12 of the Administrative Dispute Reso-
lution Act of 1996, Congress also granted the district courts authority to award bid prepara-
tion and proposal costs. Pub. L. No. 104-320, § 12(a)(3), 110 Stat. 3870, 3874 (to be
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (b)(2)). No monetary limit is stated, so, presumably, district
courts may award such monetary relief in excess of $10,000.
225. See, e.g., In re Smith & Wesson, 757 F.2d 431, 433-35 (1st Cir. 1985) (stating that by
conferring jurisdiction upon the Claims Court to award injunctive relief in the pre-award
stage of the procurement process, Congress left intact the current substantive law in this
area, known as the ScanweU Doctrine).
226. See supra note 224.
227. 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
228. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1994).
229. See, e.g., B.K Instrument, Inc. v. United States, 715 F.2d 713, 717-23 (2d Cir. 1983)
(holding that a disappointed bidder has standing to sue for declaratory and injunctive
relief); William F. Wilke, Inc. v. Department of Army, 485 F.2d 180, 182-83 (4th Cir. 1973)
(same); Merriam v. Kunzig, 476 F.2d 1233, 1240-43 (3d Cir. 1973) (same); Scanwell, 424
F.2d at 861-73 (same). Jurisdiction in the federal district courts is federal question jurisdic-
tion under section 1331 of theJudicial Code. See28 U.S.C. § 1331; see a/so Chem Serv., Inc.
v. Environmental Monitoring Sys. Lab., 12 F.3d 1256, 1261 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating that the
court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to hear the case); Choctaw Mfg. Co. v.
United States, 761 F.2d 609, 615 (11 th Cir. 1985) (same); Action Serv. Corp. v. Garrett, 790
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the APA23 ° is often summarized in Scanwell actions as follows:
[T] hose adversely affected by the award of government con-
tracts... bear a heavy burden of showing either that (1) the
procurement official's decisions on matters committed pri-
marily to his own discretion had no rational basis, or (2) the
procurement procedure involved a clear and prejudicial vio-
lation of applicable statutes or regulations.31
Since 1982, the Court of Federal Claims, while asserting a differ-
ent jurisdictional basis, 32 has applied practically the identical stan-
F. Supp. 1188, 1189 (D.P.R. 1992) (same); Fordice Constr. Co. v. Marsh, 773 F. Supp. 867,
869 (S.D. Miss. 1990) (same).
230. Section 10 of the APA reads:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory
provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency
action. The reviewing court shall-
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions
found to be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or
immunity;
(C) in excess of statutoryjurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or
short of statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sec-
tions 556 and 557 of this tide or otherwise reviewed on the
record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are sub-
ject to trial de novo by the reviewing court.
In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole record
or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of the rule of
prejudicial error.
5 U.S.C. § 706.
231. Kentron Hawaii, Ltd. v. Warner, 480 F.2d 1166, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (citations
omitted); see also Chemung County v. Dole, 781 F.2d 963, 971 (2d Cir. 1986) (adopting
basically the same standard of review for the award of a government contract as stated in
Kentron); Choctaw, 761 F.2d at 616 (same); Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Brown, 600 F.2d 429, 430,
434-35 (3d Cir. 1979) (same); Airco, Inc. v. Energy Research & Dev. Admin., 528 F.2d
1294, 1296 (7th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (same).
232. The district courts have uniformly found federal question jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331, in ScanweU cases. See, e.g., Chem Serv., 12 F.3d at 1261 (determining that a private
laboratory has standing to sue to enjoin the government from carrying out an agreement
with a competitor); Mark Dunning Indus., Inc. v. Perry, 877 F. Supp. 1541, 1541-42 (M.D.
Ala. 1995) (ordering a stay of execution and extension of the unsuccessful bidder's con-
tract); Action Serv. Corp., 790 F. Supp. at 1189 (holding that the United States Navy's failure
to conduct a responsibility determination before awarding the contract was clear error
prejudicial to the unsuccessful bidder). Whether the district courts in the future will treat
new section 1491(b) as their exclusive jurisdictional basis; or as an additive source ofjuris-
diction to federal question jurisdiction; or will follow the lead of the Federal Circuit in
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dard when assessing whether to grant relief in a ScanweU action, both
with respect to the merits of the complaint 23 3-as is now required by
statute"M-and with respect to the standards for granting a prelimi-
nary injunction.2"5 Both courts commonly state that they lack author-
ity to award a contract,3 6 but at the same time, they acknowledge
Grimbeg and find new section 1491(b) not to be jurisdictional (but only a remedy-granting
provision), see supra note 222, remains to be seen.
233. See, e.g., VMS Hotel Partners v. United States, 30 Fed. Cl. 512, 513 (1994) (stating
that the court will overturn an award of a contract only if there is no rational basis for the
decision); Shields Enters., Inc. v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 615, 622-23, 632 (1993) (same);
Magnavox Elec. Sys. Co. v. United States, 26 Cl. CL 1373, 1380-81 (1992) (same); Baird
Corp. v. United States, I Cl. Ct. 662, 664 (1983) (same). A few Court of Federal Claims
cases had articulated the standard of review for the merits to require "clear and convincing
evidence" of a breach of the implied contract to treat a bidder fairly and impartially. The
better reasoned decisions rejected that standard and applied the preponderance standard
used by the district courts in APA cases. Compare Durable Metals Prods., Inc. v. United
States, 27 Fed. Cl. 472, 477-79 (requiring clear and convincing evidence), aftd, 11 F.3d
1071 (Fed. Cir. 1993), with Isratex, Inc. v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 223, 227 (1992) (re-
jecting clear and convincing evidence test), and Arthur Forman Enters., Inc. v. United
States, 22 Cl. CL 816, 830 (1991) (same), and Logicon, Inc. v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 776,
782-83 (1991) (same). Presumably, the Court of Federal Claims will conform to the pre-
ponderance standard with the statutory requirement to apply APA standards. See infra note
235.
234. The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996 added new subsection
1491 (b) (4), which provides in part, "the courts shall review the agency's decision pursuant
to the standards set forth in section 706 of title 5." Pub. L. No. 104-320, § 12(a)(3), 110
Stat. 3870, 3875 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (b) (4)).
235. Both the Court of Federal Claims and the district courts apply the traditional four-
pronged standard when assessing whether to grant a preliminary injunction, considering
(1) the likelihood of success on the merits, (2) irreparable injury to the movant, (3) injury
to third parties, and (4) the public interest. Compare Randolph-Sheppard Vendors of Am.
v. Weinberger, 795 F.2d 90, 110 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (using the four-pronged standard to de-
termine if a preliminary injunction should be ordered), and Princeton Combustion Re-
search Lab., Inc. v. McCarthy, 674 F.2d 1016, 1019, 1022 (3d Cir. 1982) (same), and Fort
Sumter Tours, Inc. v. Andrus, 564 F.2d 1119, 1124-25 (4th Cir. 1977) (same), and DTH
Management Group v. Kelso, 844 F. Supp. 251, 254 (E.D.N.C. 1993) (same), and Geo-Con,
Inc. v. United States, 783 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1992) (same), and Allis-Chalmers Corp. v.
Friedkin, 481 F. Supp. 1256, 1263-64 (M.D. Pa.) (same), affd, 635 F.2d 248 (3d Cir. 1980),
with Magellan Corp. v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 446, 447, 451 (1993) (rejecting the clear
and convincing evidence test for a showing of likelihood of success on the merits, but using
the four factors to determine if a preliminary injunction should be ordered), and Reel-O-
Matic Sys., Inc. v. United States, 16 Cl. CL 93, 99 (1989) (using the four factors to deter-
mine if a preliminary injunction should be ordered), and Sterlingwear of Boston, Inc. v.
United States, 10 Cl. Ct. 644, 649-50 (1986) (same), and Isometrics, Inc. v. United States, 5
Cl. CL 420, 422-23 (1984) (same), and MWK Int'l, Ltd. v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 206, 208
(1983) (same).
236. See, e.g., Ulstein Maritime, Ltd. v. United States, 833 F.2d 1052, 1058-59 (1st Cir.
1987) (affirming the decision of the district court to order review of the bids by the agency
and highlighting that the lower court did not direct award of the contract to the plaintiff);
Simmons v. Block, 782 F.2d 1545, 1550 (11th Cir. 1986) (stating that the plaintiff did not
have a right to have the contract awarded to him); Chemung County, 781 F.2d at 970-71
(same); Sea-Land Serv., 600 F.2d at 432-33 (same); ScanweU 424 F.2d at 864, 869 (same);
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their authority to direct an award when the contracting officer has no
discretion under the law to do anything but award the contract to the
particular bidder.11
7
When assessing whether to issue an injunction, both the district
courts and the Court of Federal Claims frequently state that a disap-
pointed bidder suffers irreparable injury because, if an improper
award is allowed to go forward to another bidder, the disappointed
bidder will not be able to recover lost profits on the contract the bid-
der did not receive.2"' The "public interest" prong of the four-pro-
nged test for a preliminary injunction 3 9 comes into play much more
often in government contracts, however, than in other commercial
settings. Not uncommonly, the public interest in not disrupting the
government's procurement process and in allowing the government
to receive its goods or services in a timely fashion will override other
considerations that favor granting relief to an aggrieved bidder.24 °
The recent congressional action has clarified that both the Court of
Durabl Metals, 27 Fed. Cl. at 476-77 (same); Unified Indus., Inc. v. United States, 24 Cl. CL
570, 575-76 (1991) (same); Arrowhead Metals, Ltd. v. United States, 8 CI. Ct. 703, 711
(1985) (same); International Graphics, Div. of Moore Bus. Forms, Inc. v. United States, 4
Cl. Ct. 186, 193-94 (1983) (same).
237. See, e.g., Choctaw Mfg. Co. v. United States, 761 F.2d 609, 617 n.14, 619-21 (11th
Cir. 1985) (instructing lower court to award contract to plaintiff after rejecting govern-
ment's argument that it had discretion to award contract to another bidder); Delta Data
Sys. Corp. v. Webster, 744 F.2d 197, 204 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("[A] court may not order the
award of a contract unless it is clear that, but for the illegal behavior of the agency, the
contract would have been awarded to the party asking the court to order the award." (foot-
note omitted)); Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 734 F.
Supp. 20, 26 (D.D.C. 1990) (same).
238. See, e.g., Alamo Aircraft Supply v. Carlucci, 698 F. Supp. 8, 9 (D.D.C. 1988) (stating
that plaintiff will suffer harm of the loss of earnings); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v.
Shultz, 583 F. Supp. 184, 191 (D.D.C. 1984) (finding that loss of expected profits can
constitute irreparable harm); Ainslie Corp. v. Middendorf, 381 F. Supp. 305, 307 (D. Mass.
1974) (same); MagelLan, 27 Fed. Cl. at 447 (same); Magnavox, 26 Cl. CL at 1379 (same);
Essex Electro Eng'rs, Inc. v. United States, 3 Cl. Ct. 277, 287 (1983) (same); see also
O'Donnell Constr. Co. v. District of Columbia, 963 F.2d 420, 428 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (stating
that the difficulty of proving possible profits and recouping losses supports the grant of an
injunction); Delta Data Sys. Corp. v. Webster, 755 F.2d 938, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per
curiam) (stating that because the amount of profit that could be lost has been reduced,
the injunction should be lifted); M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289, 1302, 1306
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (stating that an injunction should not be ordered simply because damages
would not make the plaintiff whole); Funderburg Builders, Inc. v. Abbeville County Mem'l
Hosp., 467 F. Supp. 821, 825 (D.S.C. 1979) (stating that because lost profits are not recov-
erable, an injunction should be ordered); Keco Indus., Inc. v. United States, 428 F.2d 1233,
1240 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (holding that the plaintiff may not recover lost profits because the
contract never came into existence).
239. See supra note 235.
240. See Diebold v. United States, 947 F.2d 787, 804 (6th Cir. 1991); B.K Instrument,
Inc. v. United States, 715 F.2d 713, 730 (2d Cir. 1983); M. Steinthal & Co., 455 F.2d at 1301-
04; Pace Co., Div. of Ambac Indus. v. Resor, 453 F.2d 890, 891 (6th Cir. 1971) (per
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Federal Claims and the district courts have jurisdiction over all types
of bid protests, or Scanwell actions,24 at least for now. 42
curiam); Aero Corp. v. Department of Navy, 549 F. Supp. 39, 46 (D.D.C. 1982); Arrowhead
Metals, 8 Cl. Ct. at 717; Northern Va. Van Co. v. United States, 3 Cl. Ct. 237, 242 (1983).
241. Prior to amendment of section 1491 in the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act
of 1996, the circuit courts were broadly split on whether district courts had concurrent
jurisdiction with the Court of Federal Claims to grant injunctive relief in cases filed prior to
an award under the challenged procurement or whether the jurisdiction of the Court of
Federal Claims was exclusive in such situations. The First and Third Circuits held that
district courts had concurrentjurisdiction with the Court of Federal Claims to consider bid
protest actions brought before an award is made under the challenged solicitation. See In
re Smith & Wesson, 757 F.2d 431, 433-35 (1st Cir. 1985); Coco Bros. v. Pierce, 741 F.2d 675,
677-79 (3d Cir. 1984). The Sixth and Federal Circuits agreed with that view in dicta. See
Diebo/d, 947 F.2d at 805-06; United States v. John C. Grimberg Co., 702 F.2d 1362, 1376
(Fed. Cir. 1983) (in banc). The Fourth and Ninth Circuits found that the Court of Federal
Claims had exclusive jurisdiction in such situations. See Rex Sys., Inc. v. Holiday, 814 F.2d
994, 997-98 (4th Cir. 1987);J.P. Francis & Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 902 F.2d 740, 741-
42 (9th Cir. 1990). The Second Circuit aligned itself with that view in dicta. See B.K Instru-
ment, 715 F.2d at 721 & n.4; see also North Shore Strapping Co. v. United States, 788 F.
Supp. 344, 345-47 (N.D. Ohio 1992) (finding concurrent jurisdiction); Commercial Ener-
gies, Inc. v. Cheney, 737 F. Supp. 78, 79-80 (D. Colo. 1990) (finding no concurrentjurisdic-
tion); Metric Sys. Corp. v. United States Dep't of Air Force, 673 F. Supp. 439, 440-41 (N.D.
Fla. 1987) (same); Arrow Air, Inc. v. United States, 649 F. Supp. 993, 998 & n.8 (D.D.C.
1986) (same); Caddell Constr. Co. v. Lehman, 599 F. Supp. 1542, 1545-48 (S.D. Ga. 1985)
(same); Opal Mfg. Co., Ltd. v. UMC Indus., Inc., 553 F. Supp. 131, 132-33 (D.D.C. 1982)
(same).
The difference in interpretation was based on whether the "exclusive jurisdiction"
given to the Court of Federal Claims in former section 1491 (a) (3) of the Judicial Code, see
28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(3) (1994), meant exclusive of only the boards of contract appeals or
exclusive of the district courts as well. Those courts that found concurrent jurisdiction
relied on the legislative history of the statute. Those that did not considered the provision
unambiguous on its face and, thus, did not permit resort to the legislative history. See
Claybrook, supra note 217, at 11-16 (discussing cases and legislative history and arguing
that Congress had originally intended that the Court of Federal Claims and the district
courts have concurrent jurisdiction).
In contrast, it was established early that district courts had exclusive jurisdiction over
cases brought after the award of the challenged procurement. See GCimberg, 702 F.2d at
1374. But see Claybrook, supra note 217, at 6-11 (arguing that the Court of Federal Claims
had jurisdiction of all such actions because the court's original enabling statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1491 (a) (3) (1994), properly construed, applied to actions prior to the award of the con-
tract to the plaintiff, whether or not a contract had been awarded to a competitor). Con-
gress has altered this in the amendment of section 1491, which now grants the two courts
concurrent jurisdiction "without regard to whether suit is instituted before or after the
contract is awarded." 28 U.S.CA § 1491(b)(1) (West Supp. 1997).
242. Congress provided in section 12(c) of the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of
1996 for the General Accounting Office to undertake a study to determine whether con-
current jurisdiction is necessary. Pub. L. No. 104-320, § 12(c), 110 Stat. 3870, 3875 (to be
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(4)). In section 12(d), Congress provided that district
court jurisdiction will terminate on January 1, 2001, unless extended by Congress. Id.
§ 12(d).
The recent amendment of section 1491 also raises the issue of whether the boards of
contract appeals now have jurisdiction over bid protest cases. Former section 1491 (a) (3),
28 U.S.C. § 1491 (a) (3) (1994), stated that the Court of Federal Claims had "exclusivejuris-
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C. Application of the Common Law to Government Contract
Formation Law
In one sense, government contracts law is in step with, and was
even at the forefront of, good faith duties being applied to the negoti-
ation and formation of contracts. Since 1956, government contracts
law has consistently recognized an implied contractual duty to treat
bidders fairly, honestly, and impartially. 4 ' Although in 1956 it might
have been difficult to articulate a contractual basis for this obligation,
the present law of contractual good faith provides an ample basis. For
example, a bidder entering into precontract arrangements with the
government does not, like most parties in the commercial market-
place, begin on a blank slate. Instead, the multiple statutes, rules, and
regulations controlling government contracts negotiation, competi-
tion, and award inform the parties to a potential government contract
how they must structure their precontractual arrangements and when
and how a contract must be awarded. This regulatory framework pro-
vides the "meat" of the justified expectations of the parties and the
diction" over pre-award cases, and the legislative history makes clear that this was meant to
prevent the boards from handling such cases, because otherwise they would have had the
same powers as the Court of Federal Claims, as provided in section 8(d) of the Contract
Disputes Act of 1978, 41 U.S.C. § 607(d) (1994). See Coco Bros., 741 F.2d at 677-79 ("[T]he
House Report endeavored to make it clear that the word 'exclusive' in the statute meant
the exclusion of the boards of contract appeals. .. ."). Section 1491 as revised, however,
does not provide that the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims and the district courts
is "exclusive." Although undoubtedly not intended by Congress, reading the two statutes
in conjunction potentially vests jurisdiction of bid protests in the boards of contract ap-
peals. But see Contract Disputes Act of 1978, §§ 8(d), 10, 41 U.S.C. §§ 607(d), 609 (1994)
(providing that (a) boards only have jurisdiction of an appeal from a contracting officer's
decision as defined in the act and (b) the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims is
coextensive with the boards, but not vice versa).
243. See Heyer Prods. Co. v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 409, 412-14 (Ct. Cl. 1956). In
the recent decision of Dakota Tribal Industries v. United States, 34 Fed. Cl. 295 (1995), the
Court of Federal Claims may or may not have been correct to foreclose the plaintiff from
asserting a breach of procurement regulations because of the late pleading of that cause of
action. See id. at 298 n.2. The court was certainly incorrect, however, to cite and apply the
general rule, as reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, that good faith duties do
not adhere in contract negotiations. Id. at 298 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRAcTs § 205 cmt. c (1981)). The government's "preliminary agreement" in the contract
negotiation phase to treat all bidders fairly and equally is a firmly rooted exception to the
general rule. See Heyer, 140 F. Supp. at 412-14. Thus, the court's conclusion in Dakota that
alleged misrepresentations by a government agent made in the bidding process are action-
able only in tort because no contractual relation exists in the negotiations phase is highly
questionable, and the court's attempts to distinguish analogous cases finding breach of
contract in such situations are unpersuasive. See Dakota, 34 Fed. Cl. at 298-99.
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substance of their preliminary agreement with respect to the
procurement. 2
44
Considering the solid framework surrounding formation of gov-
ernment contracts, it was unfortunate that the Court of Federal
Claims, following the lead of the Federal Circuit, deviated from a
proper application of these contractual good faith duties when consid-
ering violations of law that affect all offerors equally. If construed
properly, Congress's recent amendment to the Tucker Act will cure
that deviation. Nevertheless, Congress has not cured, but concretized,
a second deviation of the courts. Both the Court of Federal Claims
and the district courts have failed to keep pace with the development
of the common law of contractual good faith in contract formation
with respect to the award of lost profits. The following sections ad-
dress these deviations and Congress's recent actions concerning them.
1. The Violation of Law That Affects All Offerors Equally.-Several
decisions in the Court of Federal Claims have held that, even though a
violation of procurement law and regulation has been alleged, the dis-
appointed bidder has no cause of action.245 The court has reasoned
that when the violation of law or regulation affects all bidders
equally-for example, when the government overspecifies its legiti-
mate needs and, consequently, potentially lessens competition"-
there can be no breach of the implied contract to treat all bidders
fairly and impartially because they are all being treated equally, even if
illegally.147 Similarly, these courts opine that the solicitation itself
forms the sole substance of the implied contract, and, thus, by defini-
tion, a challenge to the legality of the solicitation itself cannot be
countenanced. 2 48
The above rationale deviates from a proper understanding of the
agency's good faith duties. The government's implied contract re-
244. Cf. BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 6, at 347-49 (stating that preliminary agree-
ments may "either set out procedural rules for subsequent negotiations, or settle.. . some
of the substantive terms of the final contract, or both").
245. See, e.g., Alabama Metal Prods., Inc. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 530, 533-35 (1984)
(holding that no legitimate contractual expectation was allegedly denied, and, therefore,
plaintiff was not entitled to a remedy); Planning Research Corp. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct.
283, 290-92 (1983) (same); Hero, Inc. v. United States, 3 Cl. CL 413, 415-17 (1983) (hold-
ing that plaintiff which had not yet submitted a bid did not have any contractual rights,
regardless of whether procurement laws had been broken).
246. See New York Tel. Co. v. Secretary of the Army, 657 F. Supp. 18, 21-25 (D.D.C.
1986); BSP Div. of Envirotech Corp. v. United States EPA, 471 F. Supp. 958, 961-62 (D.N.J.
1979).
247. See Alabama Meta!, 4 Cl. Ct. at 533-35; Planning Research Corp., 4 Cl. CL at 290-92;
Hero, 3 CI. Ct. at 415-17; Claybrook, supra note 217, at 16-19.
248. See Alabama Metal, 4 Cl. C. at 534.
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quires that it treat offerors fairly and impartially, not fairly or impar-
tially. 249 In federal procurements, the concept of "fairness" is not
ephemeral or subject to reasonable doubt. Its parameters are speci-
fied extensively in the procurement laws and regulations, as well as in
the solicitation document itself.2 0 As the Supreme Court has ob-
served, the government, through procurement laws
is given the benefit of the competition of the market and
each bidder is given the chance for a bargain. [The procure-
ment laws are], therefore, in the interest of both Govern-
ment and bidder, necessarily giving rights to both and
placing obligations on both. And it is not out of place to say
that the Government should be animated by ajustice as anx-
ious to consider the rights of the bidder as to insist upon its
own.
25 1
Put in common law terms, part of the justified expectations of
every bidder is that the government will comply with all applicable
procurement laws and regulations. When it does not, the agency not
only acts illegally, it also acts contrary to the bidder's justified expecta-
tions (and the terms on which it agreed to invest in the bidding pro-
cess) and violates the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Thus, any violation of procurement law or regulation states a
cause of action, not just under the APA252 but as a breach of the im-
plied contract to treat bidders fairly and impartially.253 Treating bid-
ders "equally unfairly" does not excuse a good faith breach, and in any
249. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
250. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994).
251. United States v. Purcell Envelope Co., 249 U.S. 313, 318 (1919).
252. In applying the APA standards in ScanweU cases, district courts have not developed
a similar theory that they cannot redress violations of law that affect all bidders equally. See,
e.g., Single Screw Compressor, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Navy, 791 F. Supp. 7, 9-11
(D.D.C. 1992) (entertaining, under APA, challenges to the legality of the solicitation).
253. Even under the pre-amended section 1491, one well-reasoned decision of the
Court of Federal Claims found that the court had jurisdiction to address any violation of
law as a breach of the implied contract to treat all bidders fairly and equally. See McMaster
Constr., Inc. v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 679 (1991). Although that decision was not
broadly adopted by the judges of the Court of Federal Claims or embraced by the Federal
Circuit, cf Central Ark. Maintenance, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1338, 1342 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (endorsing a restrictive reading of the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims), it
had ample support in more longstanding precedent. Many cases have recited that the
government breaches its implied duty to treat a bidder fairly when it violates applicable
laws or regulations. See, e.g., Burroughs Corp. v. United States, 617 F.2d 590, 597-98 (Ct.
Cl. 1980) (stating that a violation of procurement laws may be grounds for recovery be-
cause it tends to show that the government treated the bid arbitrarily and capriciously);
Keco Indus., Inc. v. United States, 492 F.2d 1200, 1204 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (same). See also
Heyer Prods. Co. v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 409, 412-13 (Ct. Cl. 1956) (equating action
in conformity with procurement laws with honest consideration).
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event, for both practical and policy reasons, the presumption should
be that a violation of law is prejudicial to the aggrieved bidder." 4 Dis-
appointed bidders further a substantial public policy when they pre-
vent statutory or regulatory violations of the procurement process,. 5
and lack of prejudice should not lightly be presumed.
Congress, in amending section 1491 in the Administrative Dis-
pute Resolution Act of 1996, addressed this issue in two ways. First, it
expressly granted the Court of Federal Claims and the district courts
authority to hear objections to solicitations or "alleged violation of
statute or regulation in connection with a procurement or a proposed
procurement,"2 56 thus effectively overruling those Court of Federal
Claims decisions that had refused jurisdiction over alleged violations
of law that affected all bidders equally. Second, Congress specified
that the Court of Federal Claims "shall review the agency's decision
pursuant to [the APA]."257 Under the APA, courts are to set aside
prejudicial violations of law258 and compel agency action unlawfully
withheld.25 9 It is unlikely, therefore, that the Court of Federal Claims
will continue to deviate from the common law in this regard. Under
the amended section 1491, the Court of Federal Claims should re-
dress all prejudicial violations of law and other procurement impro-
prieties, even if they affect all bidders equally.
2. The "No Lost Profits" Rule.-As alluded to above, both the fed-
eral district courts and the Court of Federal Claims have stated repeat-
254. Even if a violation of law is established, prejudice must be shown for a disappointed
bidder to prevail. See 5 U.S.C. § 706; Grumman Data Sys. Corp. v. Widnall, 15 F.3d 1044,
1048 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Elcon Enters., Inc. v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 977
F.2d 1472, 1478-79 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Smith & Wesson, Div. of Bangor Punta Corp. v.
United States, 782 F.2d 1074, 1080 (1st Cir. 1986); Kentron Hawaii Ltd. v. Warner, 480
F.2d 1166, 1180-81 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Nevertheless, those decisions which assume that a
violation of law that applies equally to all bidders also affects all bidders equally are often
wrong as a matter of fact. For instance, an overly restrictive specification that applies to all
bidders will not prejudice a bidder that can meet the overly restrictive specification but will
prejudice a potential bidder that cannot.
255. See O'Donnell Constr. Co. v. District of Columbia, 963 F.2d 420, 429 (D.C. Cir.
1992); Hayes Int'l Corp. v. McLucas, 509 F.2d 247, 258 (5th Cir. 1975); Keco, 428 F.2d at
1237-38; Magnavox Elec. Sys. Co. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 1373, 1384-85 (1992).
256. Pub. L. No. 104-320, § 12(a)(3), 110 Stat. 3870, 3874 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1491 (b) (1)).
257. Id. § 12(a)(3), 110 Stat. at 3875 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(4)). This
amendment, making the APA applicable in both courts, was previously suggested by the
author. See Claybrook, supra note 217, at 19-21.
258. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1994).
259. Id. § 706(1). Congress retained its admonition in section 1491, not expressly stated
in the APA, that "the courts shall give due regard to the interests of national defense and
national security and the need for expeditious resolution of the action." Pub. L. No. 104-
320, § 12(a)(3), 110 Stat. at 3874 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (b) (3)).
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edly that the disappointed bidder may not be granted lost profits
under the ultimate (or "larger") contract improperly denied.2 60 For
example, in Keco Industries, Inc. v. United States,26' the Court of Claims
stated that "it would be improper for this court to award plaintiff lost
profits since the contract under which plaintiff would have made such
profits never actually came into existence." 262 The holding of Keco,
however, no longer reflects the prevailing law of contractual good
faith.263 Rather, when the terms of an improperly prevented contract
are reasonably certain, the court may award lost profits based on that
improperly prevented contract.2
64
It is hard to imagine a more appropriate situation for applying
this principle, now accepted in the common law, than in the highly
regulated field of government contracts. As a general matter in fed-
eral procurements, contract terms and conditions are not subject to
negotiation, but are fixed ahead of time by the government, often in
conformity with federal regulatory requirements or other prescribed
optional contract clauses.265 In solicitations in which the only open-
bidding term is the price, or the quality of the proposal is evaluated in
addition to price, the contract terms and conditions are certain. In
these situations, indefiniteness should not prevent the contractor
from suing in the Court of Federal Claims for lost profits on the ulti-
mate contract.
266
This does not mean that a successful disappointed bidder should
always be able to recover lost profits or that injunctive relief should
always be denied a disappointed bidder because it has a legal remedy
and thus will not be irreparably harmed. Many violations of procure-
ment law do not result in the conclusion that the disappointed bidder
would have won the competition, but rather, that the bidder should
be afforded an opportunity to compete for another chance to im-
prove its competitive position. 67 For example, if the agency's con-
260. See Keco, 428 F.2d at 1240.
261. 428 F.2d 1233 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
262. I. at 1240 (citing Heyer Prods. Co. v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 409, 412 (Ct. Cl.
1956)). Compubahn, Inc. v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 677 (1995), provides a recent applica-
tion of this precedent. In Compubahn, the Court of Federal Claims summarily dismissed
the disappointed bidder's request for lost profits, ruling that "[c]ontract law... does not
permit such a genre of recovery." Id. at 681.
263. BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 6, at 362-65.
264. Id. at 364-65.
265. See supra notes 201-203 and accompanying text.
266. As discussed earlier, any action seeking contract breach damages of greater than
$10,000 must be brought in the Court of Federal Claims, rather than in the district courts.
See supra note 224.
267. See Dynalectron Corp. v. United States, 659 F. Supp. 64, 69-70 (D.D.C. 1987).
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tracting officer conducts negotiations with one or more of the
offerors, but not with the aggrieved offeror after "best and final offers"
have been submitted, 68 the aggrieved offeror's remedy is normally to
have another opportunity to improve its offer, rather than the right to
be awarded the contract.2 69 Furthermore, many important interests
in addition to lost profits are often at stake in a procurement action
and have been recognized by the courts in considering the irreparable
injury prong of the test for preliminary injunction. 7 ° Even when re-
covering lost profits is a potential remedy, these other interests might
well dictate the grant of injunctive relief. Lost profits relief would be
especially appropriate in these situations, such as when award should
have been made to the disappointed bidder but is denied because of
the overriding public interest mandating that the illegal procurement
of the goods and services continue.271
268. The FAR requires negotiations to be reopened with all offerors. See FAR, 48 C.F.R.
§ 15.611(a) (1996).
269. See Airco, Inc. v. Energy Research & Dev. Admin., 528 F.2d 1294, 1299-1300 (7th
Cir. 1975) (per curiam); Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Md., Inc. v. United States Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., 718 F. Supp. 80, 87 (D.D.C. 1989); Dynaleron, 659 F. Supp. at 69;
see also Keco Indus., Inc. v. United States, 492 F.2d 1200, 1205 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (appeal after
decision on remand) (finding that bidder may be rejected even if all the requirements are
satisfied); Burroughs Corp. v. United States, 617 F.2d 590, 598 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (holding that
contracting officer was not required to award the contract to the plaintiff despite irregular-
ities in the bidding process); Pace Co., Div. of Ambac Indus., Inc. v. Department of Army,
344 F. Supp. 787, 790 (W.D. Tenn.) (ordering a preliminary injunction after finding viola-
tions of the regulations, but not awarding contract), rev'd per curiam sub nom. Pace Co. v.
Resor, 453 F.2d 890 (6th Cir. 1971).
270. See, e.g., O'Donnell Constr. Co. v. District of Columbia, 963 F.2d 420, 428-29 (D.C.
Cir. 1992) (constitutional violation); Fort Sumter Tours, Inc. v. Andrus, 564 F.2d 1119,
1124-25 (4th Cir. 1977) (overall effect on business); DTH Management Group v. Kelso,
844 F. Supp. 251, 254-55 (E.D.N.C. 1993) (effect on employees); Abel Converting, Inc. v.
United States, 679 F. Supp. 1133, 1142 (D.D.C. 1988) (enhancement of competition);
Sterlingwear of Boston, Inc. v. United States, 10 Cl. Ct. 644, 650 (1986) (cost savings to
government); John Carlo, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs of the United States Army, Fort Worth
Div., 539 F. Supp. 1075, 1088 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (impairment of new business opportuni-
ties); Goldhaber v. Foley, 519 F. Supp. 466, 475 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (loss of public employ-
ment); Robert E. Derecktor of R.I., Inc. v. Goldschmidt, 506 F. Supp. 1059, 1066 (D.R.I.
1980) (cost savings to government); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Friedkin, 481 F. Supp. 1256,
1264 (M.D. Pa.) (increased electric rates to consumers; plant shutdown), affd, 635 F.2d
248 (3d Cir. 1980); Art-Metal-USA, Inc. v. Solomon, 473 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1978) (over-
all effect on business); Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Marshall, 439 F. Supp. 487, 497
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (loss of follow-on contract).
271. See Pace, 453 F.2d at 891; Aero Corp. v. Department of Navy, 549 F. Supp. 39, 44-45
(D.D.C. 1982); see also Delta Data Sys. Corp. v. Webster, 755 F.2d 938, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(per curiam) (finding that the public interest requires setting aside a preliminary injunc-
tion and leaving plaintiff with only remedy of bid preparation costs). The burden of proof
in such an action should be on the private contractor to prove that, if the breach had not
occurred, it would have received the contract.
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Robert E. Derecktor of Rhode Island, Inc. v. Goldschmidt27 and Pace
Co., Division of Ambac Industries, Inc. v. Department of Arm? 73 illustrate
these considerations. In Derecktor and Pace, the government con-
tracting officers made improper responsiveness determinations-in
Derecktor, the Coast Guard's contracting officer improperly disquali-
fied Derecktor, the low bidderY14 and in Pace, the Army's contracting
officer unlawfully failed to disqualify the low bidder when Pace was
next in line for award.2 75 The district courts granted relief in both
cases. 276 The contracting officer in Derecktor then found the aggrieved
company to be "responsible"-capable of building the Coast Guard
cutters-and awarded the contract to the company.277 Injunctive re-
lief was the appropriate remedy in Derecktor, even if lost profits had
been recognized as an available remedy, because it allowed the Coast
Guard to correct its error, to act consistently with the procurement
laws, and to save money in two ways-by accepting Derecktor's lower
price and by avoiding lost profits liability to Derecktor.
A different result was obtained in Pace. After issuance of the pre-
liminary injunction, the Secretary of the Army represented that the
Vietnam War effort would be materially affected by continuation of
the injunction of the procurement of artillery shells. 278 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ordered the injunction
vacated on national defense grounds.279 Although lifting the injunc-
tion was obviously correct in that situation, Pace should not have auto-
matically been foreclosed from any remedy. The Army still had
breached its good faith covenant to make an award consistent with the
procurement laws,28 0 and Pace should have been allowed to recover
lost profits on the contract it was improperly denied (assuming it
could show it was capable of supplying the shells). The terms of the
improperly denied contract were fixed by the Army's solicitation and
by Pace's bid prices and, thus, were not subject to any debilitating
indefiniteness.8 1
272. 506 F. Supp. 1059 (D.R.I. 1980).
273. 344 F. Supp. 787 (W.D. Tenn.), rev'd per cuiam sub nom. Pace Co. v. Resor, 453 F.2d
890 (6th Cir. 1971).
274. Derecktor, 506 F. Supp. at 1060-61, 1064-66.
275. Pace, 344 F. Supp. at 788-90.
276. Derecktor, 506 F. Supp. at 1067 (declaring the initial award invalid); Pace, 344 F.
Supp. at 790 (granting a preliminary injunction).
277. Robert E. Derecktor of R.I., Inc. v. Goldschmidt, 516 F. Supp. 1085, 1090 (D.R.I.
1981).
278. Pace, 453 F.2d at 891.
279. Id.
280. Pace 344 F. Supp. at 790.
281. Id. at 788.
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Finally, the fact that the improperly withheld government con-
tract would have contained a termination-for-convenience clause
should not foreclose the disappointed bidder's recovery of lost profits.
It should not be assumed that the government would arbitrarily exer-
cise the termination-for-convenience clause to extricate itself from a
contract it should have made. Rather, it should be understood that
the government could properly exercise the termination-for-conven-
ience clause only if there were changed conditions. Existence of
changed conditions should be considered as a question of fact in each
case. If, as was the case in Pace, the contract that was improperly
awarded to another bidder is still in force and has not been termi-
nated in whole or in part, then presumably there would be no reason
to assume that the disappointed bidder's contract would have been
terminated. On the other hand, if the improperly awarded contract
has been terminated for legitimate reasons (and not as a ruse to at-
tempt to avoid the payment of lost profits), then it could normally be
assumed that the disappointed bidder's contract would have been ter-
minated for convenience as well. 8 ' Whether lost profits from a "fol-
low-on" procurement should additionally be awarded should also be a
fact-specific inquiry. For instance, if there were renewed competition
for the follow-on contract, it would be speculative as to who would win
that competition. If, however, the improperly awarded contract has
put the winning bidder in a sole-source position, it presumably would
have put the aggrieved bidder in a sole-source position, too. If future
requirements are projected, then lost profits could be awarded for the
follow-on procurement as well.
283
Congress, in its recent amendment of section 1491, had the
(probably unintended28 4) consequence of stifling the ability of the
courts to apply the common law with respect to lost profits. In ex-
panding the scope of section 1491 to include district courts, Congress
also extended to district courts the power to "award any relief that the
court considers proper. "285 District courts generally do not have au-
282. If the government determined that it had illegally awarded the contract, it would,
of course, be appropriate for the government to terminate for convenience and then to
either reprocure or award to the proper bidder. SeeJohn Reiner & Co. v. United States,
325 F.2d 438, 443-44 (Ct. Cl. 1963). In taking such action, the government could limit its
potential lost profits damages to the contractor initially improperly denied the contract.
283. See Rogerson Aircraft Corp. v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 632 F. Supp. 1494, 1503 (C.D.
Cal. 1986) (holding that spare parts sales were reasonably contemplated if the base con-
tract had not been breached and, thus, lost profits on those later expected sales are
recoverable).
284. See infra note 290 and accompanying text.
285. Pub. L. No. 104-320, § 12(a)(3), 110 Stat. 3870, 3874 (1996) (to be codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1491(b)(2)).
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thority to grant monetary relief in contract actions,2 8 6 and Congress
restricted the ability of both the district courts and the Court of Fed-
eral Claims as follows: "[A] ny monetary relief shall be limited to bid
preparation and proposal costs."28 7 It seems likely that this language
will stifle any award of lost profits, even in situations in which they
would be granted under the common law.288
That conceded, at the same time, nothing in the legislative his-
tory indicates a congressional desire to put the government in a posi-
tion superior to private parties in the marketplace.28 9 Rather, the
most obvious intent from the face of the revised statute is that Con-
gress did not want to permit an overbroad exception to the generally
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims to award mone-
tary damages for breach of contract.29 ° When Congress reconsiders
section 1491, it should amend it once again to serve both of these
interests.291 Congress should amend new section 1491 (b) (2) to read
as follows:
To afford relief in such an action, the courts may award any
relief that the court considers proper, including declaratory
and injunctive relief, except that any monetary relief in such
286. See supra note 224.
287. § 12(a)(3), 110 Stat. at 3874 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b) (2)).
288. Arguably, a separate action could be brought in the Court of Federal Claims, not
seeking equitable relief, but seeking lost profits in lieu of bid and proposal costs. Such a
suit would be analogous to suits litigants now bring for bid and proposal costs under sec-
tion 1491(a). See, e.g., Finley v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 704, 708 (1994) (seeking bid and
proposal costs); TRW, Inc. v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 155, 162 (1993) (same).
289. See 142 CONG. REc. S6156-57, S6161-63 (daily ed.June 12, 1996); H.R. REP. No. 104-
841, reprinted in id. at H11108-11 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996); id. at H11448 (daily ed. Sept.
27, 1996); id. at S11848 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996); id. at H12276 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1996).
290. See supra note 224. Congress might also have been reacting to the decision in a
Court of Federal Claims case that awarded the costs of litigation, as "bid protest" costs. See
Grumman Data Sys. Corp. v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 803, 807-10 (1993). The original
Senate bill, S.1224, which was incorporated in H.R. 2977 as an amendment, divested the
district courts ofjurisdiction entirely and did not contain any language limiting the mone-
tary relief that the Court of Federal Claims could grant. See 142 CONG. REc. S6161-63 (daily
ed.June 12, 1996). The limiting language was inserted without discussion of its purpose in
the legislative history. Its absence in the bill when the district courts were divested ofjuris-
diction and its presence when they were not suggests the language was intended to limit
the district courts from granting relief traditionally reserved to the Court of Federal
Claims.
291. Congress will be reconsidering its amended section 1491 soon in conjunction with
the study it has ordered the General Accounting Office to undertake. See § 12(c), 110 Stat.
at 3875. Such was the compromise struck between the House, which passed a bill with
concurrent jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims and the district courts, and the
Senate, which passed a bill divesting the district courts of Scanweljurisdiction. See 142
CONG. REc. S6156-57, S6161-63 (daily ed. June 12, 1996); H.R. REP. No. 104-841, reprinted
in id. at H11108-11 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996); id. at H11448 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1996); id. at
S18848 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996); id. at H12276 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1996).
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an action shall not be available in the district courts unless
under $10,000 in amount.
This language would maintain the traditional division of authority be-
tween the district courts and the Court of Federal Claims" 2 and, at
the same time, would allow aggrieved parties to recover lost profits in
circumstances in which it would be appropriate under the common
law, once again placing the federal government on an equal footing in
the marketplace with the citizens with whom it contracts.
IV. CONCLUSION
When the government enters the marketplace, it should be sub-
ject to the same contractual good faith duties as is a private party.
Although this principle is adhered to in theory and also in practice
with respect to many government contracting performance situations,
it has not been uniformly followed in termination and formation situ-
ations. Government contracts tribunals should recognize openly that
termination-for-convenience clauses, while giving the government a
significant amount of discretion, must nevertheless be exercised in
good faith-that is, in a manner consistent with the justified expecta-
tions of the parties and not to recapture opportunities foreclosed at
the time of contracting. This open recognition by government con-
tracts tribunals would vindicate the Supreme Court's proclamation
that the government cannot abort its contractual obligations simply
because it made a bad bargain. 93 Likewise, those decisions holding
that the government cannot use a termination-for-convenience clause
simply to avail itself of a better bargain would be given a firmer con-
ceptual foundation. Although subjective bad faith in appropriate
cases would be a strong indication of a breach of good faith duties, it
should not be necessary to prove subjective bad faith to find that the
government has abused its discretion to terminate for convenience.
Government contracts tribunals and Congress should also bring
contract formation law in line with common law good faith precedent.
292. Under the Little Tucker Act, the district courts have concurrent jurisdiction with
the Court of Federal Claims of contract actions under $10,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2)
(1994). Under new section 1491 (b) (2), the $10,000 limit would apparently not apply for
district court awards of "bid preparation and proposal costs." § 12(a) (3), 110 Star. at 3874
(to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (b) (2)).
293. See United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 565-66 (1961)
("Of course, the Government could not avoid the contract merely because it turned out to
be a bad bargain."); se also Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 580 (1934) ("The United
States are as much bound by their contracts as are individuals. If they repudiate their
obligations, it is as much repudiation, with all the wrong and reproach that term implies, as
it would be if the repudiator had been a State or a municipality or a citizen.'" (quoting
Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 719 (1879))).
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They should uniformly recognize that the framework of laws and regu-
lations concerning government procurement form the substance of
the justified expectations of the parties which, if violated, also violate
the government's good faith duties incorporated in its implied con-
tract to treat bidders fairly, honestly, and impartially. Moreover, in
appropriate circumstances, a disappointed bidder in a government
contract should be able to recover lost profits on the contract that the
bidder was unlawfully denied, similar to disappointed contracting par-
ties under the common law.
When the government enters the marketplace, it "contracts as
does a private person, under the broad dictates of the common
law."' This should be as true with respect to the covenant of good
faith as it is with respect to any other contractual duties. It should be
as true with respect to the termination and formation of government
contracts as it is with respect to their performance.
294. Torncello v. United States, 681 F.2d 756, 762 (Ct. CI. 1982) (en banc).
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